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Family Firms, Share liquidity, and the Effect on Firm Value 
 
The main objective of this master’s thesis is to discover how the share liquidity of family 
firms affects firm value. First I investigate the impact concentrated ownership has on firm 
performance. After that I heighten my investigation and take share liquidity into account. 
 
The first half of this master’s thesis discusses the comparisons between the performance of 
family and non-family firms according to existing literature. I present the results of previous 
studies about family firm’s performance and how active or passive control can affect it. The 
investigation of stock liquidity is also based on current literature. I discuss liquidity measures 
and liquidity adjusted capital asset pricing model. 
 
The second half of this master’s thesis consists of the empirical part. I use a regression 
analysis in which firm value is measured with Tobin’s q or the P/E-ratio. Share liquidity is 
measured with the Amihud liquidity measure. Finally I investigate a Finnish family firm, 
Lemminkäinen, and find out how the results that I get in my empirical analysis can be applied 
to their case. 
 
My dataset is a panel of 108 firms listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange from 1997 to 2008. I 
restrict the panel to non-financial firms only. I found that Finnish family firms are worse 
market performers than non-family firms. The coefficient estimate for family firms is 
statistically significant at the one-percent level. I also found a strong negative relationship 
between a family firm’s share illiquidity and firm value. The coefficient estimate for a family 
firm’s share illiquidity is statistically significant at the one-percent level as well. However, I 
did not find a statistically significant effect of a non-family firm’s share illiquidity on firm 
value.  As a conclusion, it is evident that family firms suffer the effect of share illiquidity on 
firm value. 
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 6 
1 Introduction 
 
 
Law professor Adolf Berle and economist Gardiner Means famously claimed in their book, 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property in 1932 that a new condition has developed 
within the largest American firms. There are no dominant owners, and control is maintained 
apart from ownership. However, a series of recent studies have questioned the Berle-Means 
orthodoxy, as will I. A remarkable part of the firms are still under a dominant owner and 
control is not maintained apart from ownership. (Cheffins and Bank 2009 (ref. Berle and 
Means, 1932)) 
 
Family firms are an essential part of Finnish economic life. There are about 30 family firms 
on the Helsinki Stock Exchange in which a family, a member of the family, or relative owns 
at least 25 percent of the firm’s voting rights. It is fascinating to find out how firms that are 
under the ownership of one family manage financially compared to non-family firms. This is 
a subject I will write about and one which the media has covered recently as well. In 
November 2003 Taloussanomat announced that the share price of Finnish family firms rose 
extremely high. The share price increased up to several hundred percent in old family firms in 
early 2000. In 2008 taloustieto.fi wrote that family firms are doing well on the stock market. 
According to Kalevi Tourunen’s doctoral thesis, firms on the Helsinki stock exchange benefit 
from family ownership since there is a slight difference in profitability in the favour of family 
firms (Tourunen, 2009).   
 
Unfortunately family firms have downsides as well. Concentrated ownership reduces 
investors’ interest towards family firms as an investment target due to weak liquidity 
concerning a family firm’s share. Share liquidity has been proved to have a negative effect on 
the share’s expected return – weak liquidity is compensated by a higher expected return 
(Pástor and Stambaugh; 2003 and Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman; 2001). This is 
how liquidity might affect the share price as well. Consequently one might think that 
concentrated ownership has a sort of a negative effect on a family firm’s value on the stock 
market.  In 2005 Helsingin Sanomat announced that Sanoma Oyj, Finnish family firm, sold 
6.50 percent of its capital stock. One reason for that was to improve their share liquidity.  
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It is significant to find out the financial effect that a family firm status can create on firm 
value. It is important because about a third of the firms on the Helsinki Stock Exchange are 
family firms (excluding financials companies) and about 20 percent of the sales by listed 
firms come from family firms. Is a Finnish family firm a better market performer than a non-
family firm or does weak liquidity affect a family firm’s value to the point that family firms 
are worse performers than non-family firms after all.  
 
1.1 The goal of the thesis 
 
There are some studies about family firms and the researchers of these studies have 
investigated Standard & Poor’s firms as well as Fortune 500 and 1000 firms. These firms are 
fairly big and valuable, so there is no certainty that, for a fact, we could generalize the results 
of these studies on the Finnish stock market. That is why I want to find out if there are any 
differences in the performances of Finnish family firms when being compared to Finnish non-
family firms, and what the differences might be. As a result of this master’s thesis I want to 
find out how concentrated ownership affects firm value on the market. 
 
To specify the subject of my thesis even more I want to heighten my investigation of the 
performance differences between family and non-family firms. I will take share liquidity into 
account and investigate the effects it has on the performance measures of a firm. It can be 
taken for granted that the shares of a family firm are more illiquid than the shares of a non-
family firm but I want to find out the effect this has on a firm’s value. This thesis revolves 
around three concepts: family firms, share liquidity, and firm value. As a whole I want to find 
out how the liquidity of a family firm’s share affects the firm’s value which is measured by 
performance measures. 
 
1.2 Research data 
 
For my investigation, I use firms that are currently (February 2010) listed on the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange. My dataset is a panel of 108 firms from 1997-2008 and I restrict the panel to 
non-financial firms only. The empirical part of this master’s theses consists of two parts. The 
first part looks at the effects of concentrated ownership on performance measures. I measure a 
firm’s value with two performance measures which are known as Tobin’s q and the P/E-ratio. 
 8 
My primary value measure is Tobin’s q and the alternative measure is the P/E-ratio. The 
second part extends the previous section and takes share liquidity into consideration. I use the 
same value measures as before as well as introduce the Amihud illiquidity measure to be used 
as the liquidity measure. Finally I investigate a Finnish family firm, Lemminkäinen, and find 
out how the results that I get in my empirical part can be applied to their case. 
 
1.3 The structure of the thesis 
 
My thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 examines the existing literature of 
family firms. I present the differences in both accounting performances and market 
performances between family and non-family firms. I also discuss the definition and 
endogeneity problems concerning the studies of family firms. Chapter 3 moves on to study 
share liquidity. I state the liquidity costs and three different liquidity measures. After these 
subjects I discuss how share liquidity affects the expected return and dividend policy. Chapter 
4 then combines the previous two subjects together. I discuss the relationship between three 
important concepts which are family firms, share liquidity and firm value. In chapter 5 I 
present my empirical study. I study listed companies on the Helsinki Stock Exchange from 
1997 through 2008. In the first part I find out how concentrated ownership affects a firm’s 
value and in the second part I extend the previous part taking share illiquidity into account. In 
chapter 6 I interpret the results from the previous chapter applying them to case 
Lemminkäinen. 
  
2 Family firms 
 
Approximately 20 percent of the companies found on the Finnish TOP 500 companies’ list 
are family firms (Finnish Family Firms Association). Over 30 firms of the listed companies 
on the Helsinki Stock Exchange are family firms. Sraer and Thesmar (2007) noticed that the 
premises of the Berle and Means’s model of a firm, where (1) the CEO is not an owner and 
(2) ownership is dispersed are not valid for all firms when looking at French companies on the 
French Stock Exchange. This is the case with almost a third of the Finnish public companies 
as well. It is important to investigate the relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance and also discover how concentrated ownership affects the firm’s value.  
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In this chapter I discuss family firms. I divide existing studies regarding family firms into two 
groups depending on the measure used to calculate the performance of family firms. First I 
state the accounting performance of a family firm; return on assets (ROA) is used as the 
accounting performance measure. After that I discuss the value of a family firm; Tobin’s q is 
used as the market performance measure or value measure. The two subjects under discussion 
are based on previous studies. Later on in this master’s thesis I present a comparison between 
family firms and non-family firms that are listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. In this part 
I use market performance measures because I want to investigate what the effects are on a 
firm’s value. It is interesting to know if the results found from Finnish data are consistent with 
existing literature based on inter alia S&P firms, Fortune firms and the firms on the French 
stock market.   
 
2.1 The definition of family firms 
 
The definition of a family firm varied in different studies and literature concerning family 
businesses is generally quite wide-ranging. Miller et al. (2007) have put together 28 
definitions of family firms that have been used in various studies in finance and management 
journals around the world from 1996 to 2006.  I have found a consensus between Sraer and 
Thesmar’s (2007), Villalonga and Amit’s (2006) and Anderson and Reeb’s (2003) definitions 
of a family firm. In general they report a firm as a family firm when the founder or a member 
of the founder’s family is a blockholder of the company. The first two I mentioned impose an 
additional condition that this block has to represent more than 20 percent of the voting rights.  
 
In this master’s thesis I use the Finnish Family Firms Association’s definition for family 
firms. It is as follows: 
 
In a family company business, ownership and family are tied to each other. The 
definition of a family company is as follows: 
 
1. A natural person, or his / her wife / husband, or his / her other relative owns 
the majority of the voting rights. 
2. The majority of the voting rights can be direct or indirect voting rights. 
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3. The presence of at least one family member, a relative or his / her 
authorized representative on the board of directors or management of the 
firm. 
4. In a listed company a family, a member of the family or relative owns 25 
percent of the voting rights. Indirect voting rights have to be over family 
control. 
Source: The Finnish Family Firms Association 
 
In the empirical part of my master’s thesis I study companies that are listed on the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange. Thus throughout the thesis when I refer to a family firm I also mean a listed 
company. That is why the fourth point in the Finnish Family Firms Association’s definition is 
important to my work and I use it to separate family firms from non-family firms.  
 
The definition of a family firm is a very important concept. It is critical to pay attention to the 
definition when for example comparing the performances of family firms and non-family 
firms. The result of a company’s performance may vary greatly depending on the definition of 
the family business. This fact defines why Miller et al. came to a different conclusion than 
e.g. Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Anderson and Reeb (2003). I will return to these results 
later on in this chapter.  
 
The next matter I will discuss is the performance of family firms and how it might differ from 
the performance of non-family firms. In section 2.3 I state a comparison between the 
accounting performance of family firms and non-family firms. Later on in section 2.4 I 
present how a firm’s market performance varies between family and non-family firms. 
However, before discussing these subjects I briefly present the accounting and market 
performance measures. 
 
2.2 Performance and value measures 
 
In this chapter I make a distinction between a firm’s accounting performance and market 
performance i.e. firm value. When measuring the accounting performance of a firm one might 
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use accounting measures like ROA or ROE.1 When trying to find out the value of the firm 
however, one can use e.g. Tobin’s q. The P/E-ratio is also used to measure a firm’s value.2 I 
deepen the discussion concerning ROA and Tobin’s q here because the case studies that I 
present later on use these measures as dependent variables. ROA (return on assets) is a good 
accounting measure of performance for it tells us how profitable a firm is relative to its total 
assets. ROA is defined as a net profit or net income divided by total assets (Cinnamon and 
Helweg-Larsen, 2006).  
 
Tobin’s q is a market measure of performance and it tells us how valuable a firm is.  Tobin’s 
q is the ratio of a firm’s market value to the replacement cost of all assets (Lee, 2006). If a 
firm is worth more than its value, based on what it would cost to rebuild it – Tobin’s q is more 
than 1 – then excess profits are being earned. These profits are above and beyond the level 
that is necessary to keep the firm in the industry. This measure is not necessarily used as often 
as rates of return or price-cost margins. However, according to Linderberg and Ross (1981) 
the advantage of using Tobin's q is that the difficult problem of estimating rates of return and 
marginal costs is avoided. On the other hand, for Tobin’s q to be meaningful, one needs 
accurate measures of both the market value and replacement costs of a firm's assets. 
 
Miller et al. suggested however, that Tobin’s q is an imperfect measure of performance linked 
to investor perceptions and expectations which may be off the mark. The measure doesn’t 
directly assess the actual returns of a stock, nor its risk. Tobin’s q can also be influenced by 
ownership structure thus it is critical to assess endogeneity. 
 
2.3 The relationship between ownership and accounting performance 
 
Prior international research suggests that family firms could be weaker performers than non-
family firms. Family ownership is commonly perceived as a less efficient and also a less  
 
 
1ROE is defined as net income/net profit divided by total shareholders’ equity (Cinnamon and Helweg-Larsen, 
2006). 
2
 The P/E-ratio is defined as the market price of a share divided by the earnings per share (Cinnamon and 
Helweg-Larsen, 2006). 
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profitable ownership structure than non-family (or dispersed) ownership. Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) refered to Demsetz (see Demsetz 1983) who stated that concentrated shareholders may 
choose nonpecuniary consumption and therefore take scarce resources away from profitable 
projects. Fama and Jensen (1983) also claimed that combining ownership and control allows 
owners to exchange profits for private rents. Later on Fama and Jensen (1985) analyzed the 
relations between the characteristics of the residual claims of different forms of organizational 
rules for investment decisions. They stated that large shareholders’ investment behavior may 
vary, for such shareholders don’t necessarily evaluate investments using market value rules 
that maximize the value of the firms’ residual cash flow. They may, however, derive greater 
benefits from pursuing objectives such as firm growth, technological innovation, or firm 
survival. 
 
Recent analyses of U.S. public companies indicate that family firms outperform non-family 
firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003) found, when comprising Standard & Poor’s 500 firms from 
1992 through 1999 that family firms outperform non-family firms. They used a profitability-
based measure of firm performance (ROA) and found that family firms are significantly better 
performers than non-family firms. Anderson and Reeb used the fractional equity ownership of 
the founding family and (or) the presence of family members on the board of directors to 
identify a family firm.  
 
Sraer and Thesmar (2007) also found that the ROA for family firms was greater than the one 
of non-family firms. They documented the performance of firms that are listed on the French 
Stock Exchange between 1994 and 2000. They defined a firm as a family firm when the 
founder or a member of the founder’s family is a blockholder of the company. They also 
applied an additional condition that this block has to represent more than 20% of the voting 
rights. 
 
Table 1 illustrates Anderson and Reeb’s results of regressing firm performance on family 
ownership.3 This table presents ROA calculated with the earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). In addition Anderson and Reeb used net income 
divided by total assets as a dependent variable which I do not present here. Whether they used 
EBITDA or net income as a dependent variable they got results that are parallel to each other.  
 
3 See more accurate definitions and calculations of variables in appendix 1. 
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Table 1 The accounting measure of a firm’s performance 
              
                Return on Assets 
(1)                     (2)                     (3) 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anderson and Reeb’s results of regressing firm performance on family ownership. t-values are in  parentheses. 
* Significant at the five-percent level.  ** Significant at the one-percent level.                                         
Source: Anderson and Reeb 2003, pp. 1316-1317 
INTERCEPT   0.287 0.265 0.266  
   (9.55) (8.02) (8.30) 
FAMILY FIRM  0.010 * 
   (2.42) 
YOUNG FAMILY FIRM   0.028 ** 
(AGE <50 YEARS)    (2.90) 
OLD FAMILY FIRM   0.014 ** 
(AGE ≥ 50 YEARS)   (3.51) 
CEO HIRE     0.008 
     (1.63) 
CEO FOUNDER    0.035 ** 
     (2.83) 
CEO DESCENDANT    0.019 ** 
     (3.61) 
OFFICER/DIRECTORS OWN 0.014 0.014 0.081 0.035 
(LESS FAMILY)  (0.22) (1.00) (0.57) 
UNAFFILIATED  -0.014 ** -0.013 ** -0.014 ** 
BLOCKHOLDERS  (3.80) (3.35) (3.61) 
OUTSIDE DIRECTORS  -0.016 -0.006 -0.010 
   (1.43) (0.53) (0.88) 
CEO EQUITY-BASED PAY  0.008 0.009 0.011 
   (1.18) (1.20) (1.58) 
R&D/SALES   0.251 ** 0.218 ** 0.249 ** 
   (3.07) (2.61) (3.02) 
LT DEBT/TOTAL ASSETS  0.037 0.041 * 0.039 * 
   (1.86) (2.01) (1.99)  
RETURN VOLATILITY  -0.207 ** -0.185 ** -0.211 ** 
   (7.43) (6.86) (7.66) 
LN(TOTAL ASSETS)  0.005 0.005 * 0.005 ** 
   (2.14) (2.35) (2.27) 
LN(FIRM AGE)  -0.029 ** -0.029 ** -0.026 ** 
   (5.93) (5.07) (4.95) 
ADJUSTED R SQUARE  0.365 0.363 0.363 
OBSERVATIONS  2,713 2,713 2,713 
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In table 1 we can easily see that family firms outperform non-family firms. The coefficient 
estimate for family firms (0.010) is positive and significant at the five-percent level. 
According to Anderson and Reeb’s calculation family firms appear to return 6.65 percent 
more than non-family firms. They calculated it as follows; coefficient estimate divided by 
average ROA=0.010/0.1501=0.0665.  
 
For comparison I will also present Sraer and Thesmar’s (2007) results in table 2.4 The 
dependent variable is ROA like it was in Anderson and Reeb’s case. The Results in table 2 are 
shown to be parallel to table 1. The difference in the ROA between family and non-family 
firms is 1.7 percentage points and it is significant at the one-percent level.5 
 
Slightly older studies have also observed the significance of family firms for according to 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) concentrated ownership is good for a firm’s value. They studied 
511 U.S. corporations and argued, both conceptually and empirically, that the structure of 
corporate ownership varies systemically in ways that are consistent with value maximization. 
Family firms consist of concentrated investors and they have substantial economic incentives 
to diminish agency costs and maximize firm value, specifically because the family’s wealth is 
so closely linked to the firm’s welfare. 
 
I will follow the previous topic by discussing two important factors which can be taken into 
account when measuring the performance of family firms. These two important factors are a 
family firm’s control type and the firm’s age. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 See more accurate definitions and calculations of variables in appendix 2. 
5 Notice that Sraer and Thesmar have multiplied results by 100 in the table 2. 
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Table 2 The accounting performance of family firms 
 
                 Return on Assets (x 100) 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Sraer and Thesmar’s results of regressing firm performance. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the five-percent level. ** Significant at the one-percent level. 
 Source: Sraer and Thesmar 2007, pp. 719 
 
 
            (1)                                    (2) 
FAMILY FIRM      1.7**   
       (0.6) 
FOUNDER CEO    1.8** 
     (0.8) 
DESCENDANT CEO    1.9** 
     (0.7) 
PROFESSIONAL CEO    1.5** 
     (0.7) 
LOG (ASSETS)      -0.3**  -0.4** 
    (0.1)  (0.1) 
LOG (FIRM AGE)      -0.6*  -0.7** 
       (0.3)  (0.3) 
FORMER SOE       -0.9  -1.0 
       (0.7)  (0.7) 
FRACTION EQUITY      0.4  0.4 
OF LARGEST BLOCK      (1.0)  (1.0) 
 
DEBT/ASSETS      -9.2**  -9.3** 
       (1.2)  (1.2) 
STOCK RETURN      -8.1**  -8.2**  
VOLATILITY       (1.9)  (1.9) 
INDUSTRY FE      yes  yes 
YEAR FE       yes  yes 
HEIR=PROFESSIONAL    0.65 
ADJUSTED R SQUARE      0.22  0.22 
OBSERVATIONS      2,325  2,325 
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2.3.1 Active versus passive family control 
 
There are different control types when it comes to family firms. The control type can either be 
active or passive. In an active control firm there is a family member as the firm’s CEO or in a 
top management position. Whereas passive control means that family members don’t 
participate in the firm’s management. Some studies have taken these family control types into 
account in their regression analyses and they have had different results depending on whether 
there is active or passive control. I present some of these results which affect the performance 
of a firm. 
 
It is a rather common characteristic in family firms that family members serve as the firm’s 
CEO or fill other top management positions. This is how a family can align the firm’s 
interests more readily with those of the family. In this case the classic owner-manager conflict 
can completely be deleted. Some studies (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Amit and Villalonga, 
2006; Sraer and Thesmar, 2007) have found evidence that family-managed firms are 
profitable. In table 1 we can examine the management effect. The CEO FOUNDER, CEO 
DESCENDANT and CEO HIRE denote whether the CEO is the founder of the firm, a 
descendant of the founder, or a non-family member in a family firm respectively. The 
coefficient estimate for the CEO FOUNDER is 3.5, for the CEO DESCENDANT the estimate 
is 1.9 and for the CEO HIRE it is 0.8.6 Based on return on assets, family firms appear to be 
better performers only when a family member, either founder or descendant, serves as the 
CEO because the coefficient estimate on the CEO HIRE is not statistically significant. Instead 
the coefficient estimates for the CEO FOUNDER as well as for the CEO DESCENDANT are 
positive and statistically significant at the one-percent level. This indicates that active family 
involvement in management positions is associated with improved firm performance. 
 
Nevertheless, the excellence of family-managed firms was not solely based on the absence of 
the owner-manager conflict. Amit and Villalonga (2006) as well as Sraer and Thesmar (2007) 
came to a conclusion that founder-managed firms are very profitable. One of the reasons for 
the founder-effect, according to Sraer and Thesmar, is that founders simply have greater labor 
 
 
6 I multiplied these numbers by 100 so it is now comparable with Sraer and Thesmar’s numbers. 
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productivity. They came to this result by breaking down ROA into different components 
which are labor productivity, wage, capital intensity, covariance and the effect of observables. 
First they used the following decomposition of ROA: 
 
ROA = (L/A) x (Y/L – w),     (1) 
  
where L/A represents labor intensity and it is measured as the ratio of the number of 
employees to book value of total assets. Y/L represents labor productivity and it is measured 
as the ratio of value added i.e. total sales less non-labor costs of inputs to the number of 
employees. Finally w is the average wage paid to employees and it is measured as total labor 
costs divided by the number of employees. 
 
 Then Sraer and Thesmar used equation (1) to break down the conditional difference in ROA 
between family and non-family firms into differences in productivity, wage, and capital 
intensity. Sraer and Thesmar’s algebra showed that the unconditional difference in average 
ROA between family and non-family firms can be re-written as 
  
ROA = ROAF – ROANF 
            =           (L/A)F(Y/L)                        –            (L/A)Fw                     (2) 
               unconditional difference in productivity         unconditional difference in wage 
               +         (Y/L – w)NF(L/A)              +           [Cov((L/A), (Y/L) – w)]. 
               unconditional difference in capital intensity                 difference in covariance 
  
In additional to the three obvious effects, labor productivity, wage, and capital intensity, the 
difference in the covariance of L/A and (Y/L – w) for family and non-family firms are needed 
to include. Moreover, they were interested in the contribution of conditional rather than 
unconditional differences in labor productivity, wage, and capital intensity to total 
performance, as they did not want to capture effects stemming from differences in 
observables. So they added a fifth term to equation (2), which indeed captures the effect of 
differences in observable characteristics across types of firms. 7 
 
 
7
 See more detailed algebra Sraer and Thesmar 2007, pp. 747. 
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The difference in ROA between founder-run firms and non-family firms is 2.1 percentage 
points. Higher labor productivity accounts for 2.6 percentage points of the 2.1 percentage 
points. These numbers and others as well can be found in table 3. The labor productivity 
effect is very large for it explains nearly all of the differences in profitability between family 
firms and non-family firms. However, Sraer and Thesmar admit that this effect is very 
imprecisely estimated in their regression. 
 
Table 3 The contributors in a family firm performance 
 
ROA coming 
from… 
Higher 
capital 
intensity 
Lower 
wage 
Higher labor 
productivity 
Difference in 
observables 
Low 
covariance 
 
Total 
 
Founder  
CEO 
 
-0.003 
 
0.4 
 
2.6 
 
-0.2 
 
-0.7 
 
2.1 
 
Descendant 
CEO 
Professional 
CEO 
-0.002 
 
0.015 
2.7 
 
3.6 
-0.6 
 
-4.7 
-0.6 
 
0.2 
1.0 
 
1.4 
2.2 
 
1.7 
Source: Sraer and Thesmar 2007, pp. 725 
 
 
Let’s go back to table 2 and take a look at the effects of active and passive control once again. 
When looking at column 2 (the FOUNDER CEO, the DESCENDANT CEO and the 
PROFESSIONAL CEO -lines) we can see that over-performance is present for all types of 
management. The coefficient estimates are 1.8, 1.9, and 1.5 respectively and they all are 
statistically significant at the one-percent level. Sraer and Thesmar’s results are strikingly 
consistent with Anderson and Reeb’s results with the exception of professionally run firms. 
Sraer and Thesmar found that professional managers are very similar to the rest of the family 
group. 
 
Anderson and Reeb as well as Sraer and Thesmar concluded that descendant-managed firms 
outperform non-family firms. Descendants manage to pay lower wages for similar skill and 
productivity. To the question of how they can succeed in paying lower wages without 
recruiting low skill workers and still obtain a high level of labor productivity, Sraer and 
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Thesmar answered that descendants can commit on long-term employment for descendant-
managed firms promise that most workers will keep their jobs even if total sales decrease. 
Descendant managers, because of their longer horizon, find it easier than professional 
managers to sustain reputational contracts with their workers for more insurance in exchange 
of lower wages.  
 
Larger labor productivity explains most of the difference in the ROA between founder-
managed firms and non-family firms. Lower wage equivalently explains most of the 
difference between descendant-managed and non-family firms. The difference in the ROA 
between professionally-managed firms and non-family firms comes from the fact that 
professional CEOs manage capital more efficiently. First, on average, they pay lower interest 
rates on their outstanding debt and second, their external acquisitions tend to be, in the long 
run, more profitable. Sraer and Thesmar also found out that outside CEOs hire lower-skilled 
workers. That may explain why labor productivity is much lower in a firm that has an outside 
CEO than in non-family firms. Outside CEOs might also substitute unskilled labor to capital, 
to make invested capital more profitable. 
 
Sraer and Thesmar broke down ROA for professional CEOs and descendant CEOs as well as 
they did for ROA of the founder CEO case. The second line in table 3 compares the 
descendant CEOs of family firms to non-family firms. In this case the biggest part of the 
effect is a result from the difference in wage levels. The lower wage component explains 2.7 
percentage points of the difference in the ROA between descendant-managed and non-family 
firms. This proves the fact that descendant-managed firms reap the benefit from paying lower 
wages.  The third line looks at the components of the difference in the ROA between 
professionally-managed firms and non-family firms. This picture is a little more complex 
since professional CEOs pay lower wages but the benefit for the investors is more than 
compensated by a lower productivity rate (-4.7). Professional CEOs compensate low labor 
productivity by running operations with high capital intensity. In table 3 the difference in the 
ROA between professionally-managed firms and non-family firms is 2.2. Capital intensity 
explains 0.015 percentage points of this difference.  
 
Sraer and Thesmar’s study suggests that family firms whether run by founder, descendant, or 
professional CEO may be achieving higher profits than non-family firms. There are three 
different means for better profitability: (1) founders have larger labor productivity (2) 
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descendants manage to pay lower wages for similar skill and productivity and (3) professional 
CEOs manage capital more efficiently. In general Sraer and Thesmar’s as well as Anderson 
and Reeb’s analyses indicate that family firms are better performers than non-family firms.  
 
2.3.2 The ages of family firms 
 
A firm’s age is another important factor which makes a difference between family firms and 
also separates them from non-family firms. There has been a lot of conversation about the 
ages of firms and how it affects their performances. According to Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
family firms, on average, are younger (63 versus 74) than non-family firms and because of 
this they exhibit significantly higher growth than non-family firms. These characteristics may 
raise a concern that the superior performance of family firms is driven by the predominance of 
other similar high-growth companies that have had success in their early-stages while still 
under founder management or control. When taking this fact into consideration many prior 
literatures suggest that founders bring value-adding skills to a firm that result in superior 
performance when the firms are young.  However, when firms continue to age family 
members put forth less of a contribution towards the firm’s productivity and efficiency. Better 
performance in family firms is attributable primarily to the youngest firms.  
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) have taken the age problem into account. When they measured a 
family firms association to firm value they controlled the firm’s age in their regression 
analysis. Anderson and Reeb classified family firms as YOUNG and OLD based on whether 
the firm is under or over 50 years of age. This can be seen in table 1. The coefficient estimate 
for a YOUNG FAMILY FIRM is 0.028 for an OLD FAMILY FIRM the number is 0.014. 
Although, younger firms have a greater impact on ROA, older firms have a positive impact on 
the firm’s performance as well. They both are statistically significant at the one-percent level. 
As a result both young and old family firms exhibit a significant and positive effect on ROA. 
This suggests that regardless of a firm’s age, on average, family firms are better performers 
than non-family firms.  
 
50 years is not necessarily the right cut off point to divide firms into young and old categories. 
The 25th percentile of age for their sample of firms is 45.8 years. That suggests that Anderson 
and Reeb’s categorization captured firms in the first quartile based on age. Because of that 
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and to avoid arbitration Anderson and Reeb also used cut off points of 35, 40, 45, 55, and 60 
years. When using these points they found similar results. 
 
When relying on recent studies I get a slight hint of the fact that family firms could be better 
accounting performers than non-family firms. From the accounting performance of family 
firms I will move on to the firm value of family firm. The next section is about the market 
performance of family firms.  
 
2.4 The relationship between ownership and market performance 
 
In the second part of this chapter I discuss the value of a firm. As in the previous part there is 
no consensus among all the studies in this part either. There are some studies about the debate 
on whether family firms are more or less valuable than non-family firms. Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988) find that among large U.S corporations family firms are less valuable than 
non-family firms, whereas Anderson and Reeb (2003) came to the opposite result. There are 
many studies in which the evidence is scarce but also mixed. First I will state Villalonga and 
Amit’s view of how family ownership, control and management affect firm value. It is 
interesting to take these three aspects into consideration. Then I will present Anderson and 
Reeb’s results of regressing firm value on family ownership. Their regression is the same 
presented in table 1 but this time the dependent variable is Tobin’s q instead of ROA.  
 
2.4.1 The Main effects of family ownership, control, and management on firm 
value 
 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) stated that to understand when family firms trade at a premium or 
a discount relative to non-family firms, one must distinguish three fundamental elements in 
the definition of family firms. These three elements are ownership, control, and management.  
 
(1) First, according to Villalonga and Amit (2006) one has to find out if family 
ownership creates or destroys value? There are different interpretations of that. 
Berle and Means (see Villalonga and Amit, 2006) suggest that concentrated 
ownership should have a positive effect on value because family ownership 
alleviates the conflicts of interest between owners and managers. Demsetz (see 
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Villalonga and Amit, 2006) however, argues that ownership concentration is the 
endogenous outcome of profit-maximizing decisions by current and potential 
shareholders, so it should have no effect on firm value. 
 
2) Second, Villalonga and Amit (2006) stated that one has to find out if family 
control creates or destroys value? In family firms the classic owner-manager 
conflict is mitigated due to large shareholders’ greater incentives to monitor the 
manager. This is often referred to as Agency Problem I. However, there is 
another type of conflict as well. Large shareholders may use their controlling 
position in firms to extract private benefits at the expense of the small 
shareholders. This is called Agency Problem II.  Villalonga and Amit stated that 
if the large shareholder is an individual or a family, it has greater incentives for 
both expropriation and monitoring which are thereby likely to lead Agency 
Problem II to dominate Agency Problem I. There is no evidence however, to 
which of these two agency problems is more detrimental to shareholders. 
 
(3) Third, according to Villalonga and Amit (2006) one has to find out if family 
management creates or destroys value? The agency theory would predict a 
positive effect on the value of family management because family management 
reduces or even eliminates Agency Problem I. This effect however, may be 
offset by the costs of family management if hired professionals are better 
managers than family founders or their heirs. Morck et al. (1988), Adams et al. 
(2009), and Fahlenbrach (2009) found that founder-CEO firms are more 
valuable – they trade at a premium – than other firms. On the other hand, Smith 
and Amoako-Adu (1999) concluded that the stock market reacts negatively to 
the appointment of family heirs as managers.  
 
Using these three elements Villalonga and Amit tried to find out if there is a positive family 
effect on firm value and how this effect varies when the CEO position is filled with a founder, 
a descendant, or someone from the outside.  They also wanted to know how and when do 
Agency Problem I and II exist? 
 
Villalonga and Amit’s sample comprised data from 508 firms listed on the Fortune 500 during 
1994-2000. They defined family firms the same way as Anderson and Reeb did in which the 
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founder or a member of his or her family by either blood or marriage is an officer, director, or 
blockholder, either individually or as a group. They used Tobin’s q – the ratio of the firm’s 
market value to the replacement costs of its assets – as their dependent variable. They 
interpreted it as a measure of the firm’s value. Villalonga and Amit found that the mean 
Tobin’s q is 0.23 units higher for family firms than it is for non-family firms. 
 
Villalonga and Amit measured the effects of family ownership, control, and management on 
value by the multivariate OLS regression. They measured family ownership with a family 
ownership dummy and family ownership stake. The family ownership stake was a continuous 
measure that was the percentage of shares of all classes held by the family as a group to 
measure ownership. In the Tobin’s q regression the coefficient estimate for the family firm 
dummy was 0.26 and for the family ownership stake it was 0.66. They were both positive and 
the coefficient estimate for the family ownership dummy was statistically significant at the 
five-percent level and the coefficient estimate on the family ownership stake was statistically 
significant at the ten-percent level. Family control was measured by a dummy that indicate 
the presence of a control-enhancing mechanism such as multiple share classes, pyramids, 
cross-holdings, or voting agreements. The continuous measure for family control was family 
excess voteholdings. It was the difference between the percentage of all votes outstanding 
held by the family and the family ownership stake. The coefficients for both control-
enhancing mechanisms (-0.21) and excess voteholdings (-0.12) were negative and the first 
one was statistically significant at the five-percent level and the latter one was statistically 
significant at the ten-percent level. Finally Villalonga and Amit measured family management 
using a dummy that indicated the presence of a family CEO. Family management has no 
significant effect on value. Villalonga and Amit’s findings suggested that despite of the costs 
associated with the family’s excess control, the benefits of family ownership prove that 
minority shareholders are better off than they would have been in a non-family firm.  
 
Villalonga and Amit also examined Agency Problems I and II. They measured the absence of 
Agency Problem I by assuming the fact that having a family CEO eliminates the conflict 
between owners and managers. The presence of Agency Problem II was measured by 
assuming that families, which use the mechanism that enhances their voting power over their 
equity ownership stake, create a conflict between large (family) and small (non-family)  
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shareholders. By examining these problems we can devise four types of firms.8 The most 
notable result was that the absence of any agency problem is associated with the highest 
average q (2.66) among the four groups. In other words, family firms whose CEO is a 
member of the family, and which have no control-enhancing mechanism, enjoy the highest 
market value. 
 
2.4.2 Active versus passive family control 
 
I previously presented results of how active or passive family control affects the accounting 
performance of a family firm.  How active or passive control affects the market performance 
of a family firm has been studied as well. Villalonga and Amit (2006) as well as Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) tested the effects that the founder CEO, descendant CEO, and hire CEO 
have on the value of a family firm. I briefly present both results due to comparison.  
 
Villalonga and Amit examined the effects that the founders, descendants, hires in the roles of 
CEO as well as the Chairman have on Tobin’s q. They found that founder-CEO firms are the 
most valuable of all family and non-family firms. Firms with a founder-CEO and Chairman 
have the highest average Tobin’s q which is 3.12. Tobin’s q of the firms in which the founder 
remains as the Chairman but hires an outside CEO is almost as high, 2.81. Founder skills are 
almost as valuable when bringing them to the firm through a position as CEO or Chairman 
with a hired CEO in place. Descendant-CEO firms are the least valuable. The firm where the 
founder remains as the Chairman but a descendant is in the role of CEO has the lowest mean 
Tobin’s q which is 1.61.  
 
Anderson and Reeb’s results of the regression with Tobin’s q as the dependent variable are in 
table 4.9 I attached the results here because table 1 has the same regression but the dependent 
variable is ROA and it is interesting to see if there are differences in the coefficient estimates. 
First of all the coefficient estimate for a family firm is positive and significant at the one-
percent level. It is 0.142. It suggested that Tobin’s q in family firms is 10.00 percent higher 
 
8
 Type 1 family firm: No Agency Problem I, Yes Agency Problem II. Type 2: Yes Agency Problem I, Yes 
Agency Problem II. Type 3: No Agency Problem I, No Agency Problem II. Type 4: Yes Agency Problem I, No 
Agency Problem II. 
9  See more accurate definitions and calculations of variables in appendix 1. 
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than in non-family firms.10 In table 4 both YOUNG and OLD family firms are associated with 
a greater Tobin’s q. The coefficient estimates are 0.265 and 0.102 respectively.  The 
coefficient estimate for a YOUNG family firm is statistically significant at the one-percent 
level and the estimate for an OLD family firm is significant at the five-percent level. So 
young family firms have a greater effect on Tobin’s q than old family firms. Finally Anderson 
and Reeb examined the founder, descendant, and hire CEOs. Consistent with the accounting 
measures of performance they found that founders are associated with greater firm values. 
The coefficient estimate for CEO FOUNDER is 0.472 and it is significant at the one-percent 
level. Hired CEOs also exhibit a significant and positive association with Tobin’s q. The 
coefficient estimate for that is 0.123 and it is also significant at the one-percent level. 
However, descendant-CEO firms according to Anderson and Reeb are unrelated to market 
performance. This fact suggested that market participants view descendants similarly to CEOs 
in non-family firms. 
 
2.5 The wavering definition of a family firm 
 
In section 2.3 I stated how old and new studies did not reach the same conclusion on whether 
family firms are better performers than non-family firms. To make this puzzle even more 
confusing Miller et al. (2007) came to both conclusions. They found that family firms may be 
good performers but when altering the definition of a family business they also came to the 
conclusion that in family businesses there is no evidence of superior performance.  
 
As I mentioned earlier the definition of a family firm has a great importance to the results of 
firm performance.  Miller et al. came to different conclusions when studying family 
businesses in the U.S because they used a more exact definition of family firms. Their sample 
consisted of Fortune 1000 firms from 1996 to 2000 and Tobin’s q was used as a dependent 
variable. They made a distinction between lone founder businesses in which no relatives of a 
 
 
 
 
10 Anderson and Reeb calculated this as the coefficient estimate of family firms (0.142) divided by the average 
Tobin’s q for the sample (1.415). 
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Table 4 Market measure of firm performance 
       
     Tobin’s q 
         (1)                     (2)                      (3)  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anderson and Reeb’s results of regressing firm performance on family ownership. t-values are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the five-percent level. ** Significant at the one-percent level. 
 
Source: Anderson and Reeb, 2003, pp. 1318 
 
 
INTERCEPT   3.638 3.421 3.473 
   (17.14) (15.28) (15.79) 
FAMILY FIRM  0.142 ** 
   (3.63) 
YOUNG FAMILY FIRM   0.265 ** 
(AGE ≤50 YEARS)    (3.54) 
 
OLD FAMILY FIRM   0.102 * 
(AGE > 50 YEARS)   (2.56) 
 
CEO HIRE     0.123 ** 
     (2.82) 
CEO FOUNDER    0.472 ** 
     (4.83) 
CEO DESCENDANT    0.057 
     (1.05) 
OFFICER/DIRECTORS OWN  1.666  2.744 * 1.737 * 
(LESS FAMILY)  (1.92) (2.53) (1.98) 
UNAFFILIATED  -0.345 ** -0.332 ** -0.345 ** 
BLOCKHOLDERS  (10.59) (10.09) (10.66) 
OUTSIDE DIRECTORS  0.040 0.074 0.072 
   (0.41) (0.74) (0.73) 
CEO EQUITY-BASED PAY  0.209 ** 0.230 ** 0.231 ** 
   (3.38) (3.64) (3.80) 
R&D/SALES   4.609 ** 4.141 ** 4.538 ** 
   (6.99) (6.10) (6.91) 
LT DEBT/TOTAL ASSETS  -1.032 ** -1.097 ** -1.025 ** 
   (7.95) (8.14) (7.97)       
RETURN VOLATILITY  -1.896 ** -1.740 ** -1.967 ** 
   (9.85) (8.83) (10.14) 
LN(TOTAL ASSETS)  -0.093 ** -0.079 ** -0.101 ** 
   (5.61) (4.69) (6.24) 
LN(FIRM AGE)  -0.200 ** -0.192 ** -0.149 ** 
   (5.87) (5.36) (4.36)  
ADJUSTED R SQUARE  0.411 0.413 0.416 
OBSERVATIONS  2,713 2,713 2,713 
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founder are involved and true family businesses that do include multiple family members as 
major owners and managers. As a result they found that lone founder businesses 
outperformed non-family firms but when removing lone-founder businesses from the family 
business category, there is no longer evidence of superior performance. The coefficient 
estimate for combined family firms – both lone founder and true family business –  was 0.173 
and it was statistically significant at the five-percent level. When removing lone-founder 
firms the coefficient estimate for family firms was 0.026 and it was not statistically significant 
anymore. The coefficient estimate for lone founder firms alone was 0.478 and this was 
significant even at the 0.1-percent level. The out-performance of family firms was a result of 
how these firms were defined. 
 
Sraer and Thesmar (2007) and Anderson and Reeb (2003) as well as Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) used a rather loose definition. Sraer and Thesmar reported firm as a family firm when 
the founder or a member of the founder’s family is a blockholder of the company. Anderson 
and Reeb used the fractional equity ownership of the founding family and (or) the presence of 
family members on the board of directors to identify family firms. Villalonga and Amit 
initially defined family firms following Anderson and Reeb’s definition. All these definitions 
are rather loose and I think a firm receives a family firm status quite easily. Sraer and 
Thesmar imposed an additional condition that the block must represent more than 20 percent 
of the voting rights. However, they concluded that this additional condition is not very 
important as they had a few cases where family shareholders held less than 20 percent of the 
voting rights. Villalonga and Amit also examined how their results change when they 
imposed additional conditions. They examined nine alternative definitions. The coefficient 
estimate for family firms in which the family is the largest shareholder and has at least 20 
percent of the votes was not statistically significant anymore. As a conclusion we can really 
believe that a definition of a family firm really matter. 
 
2.6 Discussion on the endogeneity of family ownership and performance 
 
 
Many family studies potentially suffer from an endogeneity problem. The problem is whether 
family ownership improves performance or strong performances prompt families to maintain 
their holdings. For this reason the cross-sectional evidence that I have discussed above cannot 
be interpreted as evidence of a causal effect of family ownership on performance.  
 28 
 
The first conclusion for a problem of that kind is that family status depends on performance. 
The trouble is whether family ownership improves performance or that strong performances 
generate families to maintain their holdings. Anderson and Reeb (2003) have stated two 
arguments for greater performance. The first argument is that families have held their stakes, 
on average, for 75.9 years and this leads to exceptional foresight for predicting performance. 
The second argument implies that families, as investors, have special insights in ascertaining 
future firm performance. Anderson and Reeb used instrumental-variable regression to 
estimate that family ownership is potentially a function of superior firm performance. Their 
estimates from instrumental-variable regression are consistent with their prior OLS results, 
suggesting that family firms are superior performers when compared to non-family firms. 
 
A second reason for the endogeneity problem is the endogenous sample selection. Sraer and 
Thesmar (2007) stated the following example. Assume that descendant-controlled firms 
which do badly have a higher tendency to go bankrupt or tend to be sold out to a large 
investor or private equity investors. In this case, the only descendant-managed firms which 
would survive would be the ones that do relatively well, which would then lead us to 
overestimate their performance. They piloted this assumption by looking at the profitability of 
all types of firms prior to de-listing from 1994 to 1999. Before de-listing, exiting firms have, 
in general, a level of profitability that is very similar to that of the remaining firms. The only 
sizeable difference came from descendants. Staying descendant-owned underperform those 
who go private by three percentage industry adjusted ROA. As a result they suggested that 
endogenous attrition leads to underestimated, rather than overestimated, performances of 
descendant-managed firms. 
 
Overall, regardless of the received result, we cannot completely eliminate the possibility that 
families are more likely to exit firms with poor future performances. We cannot eliminate the 
whole endogeneity problem either. Family ownership is an endogenous variable and this 
implies that we cannot know for sure if the greater performances observed in family firms are 
a reason or consequence. As it is said every action has an equal reaction. 
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2.7 Discussion on selection bias 
 
Besides endogeneity, selection bias is another important factor that may affect the findings. 
Miller et al. (2007) have found that the results are highly sensitive to the nature of the sample. 
One concern is that family or lone founder firms – depending on the definition of a family 
firm and what the research wants to find out – that become part of such indices may not be 
representative of all types of firms. Therefore it is important not to over generalize findings 
based on the analyses of similar firms. A firm that is defined as a family firm when the 
founder or a member of the founder’s family is a blockholder of the firm might be rather 
different than a firm that is defined as a family firm when the founder owns at least 25 percent 
of the voting rights. 
 
Researches that I have mentioned earlier have focused on firms in major indices such as 
Fortune 500 and 1000, the French stock exchange and Standard & Poor’s 500 firms. These 
collections consist mainly of large firms so the results may not hold for smaller firms. The 
whole sample might suffer selection bias. The research period is also almost the same in three 
studies that I have mentioned above (Anderson and Reeb, 1992-1999; Sraer and Thesmar, 
1994-2000; Villalonga and Amit, 1994-2000). This period of time includes the global 
economic boom which resulted partly from the powerful drive of telecommunications and this 
could also skew the results a bit.  
 
3 Liquidity 
 
The third chapter covers liquidity, share liquidity to be exact. Before moving on to the 
discussion on liquidity measures I will define the costs that revolve around liquidity. After 
that I present how liquidity affects expected return and asset pricing. I also mention a few 
words about the relationship between a firm’s dividend policy and share liquidity. 
 
In the financial market according to Amihud and Mendelson (2008), a company’s debt as well 
as its equity are said to be liquidity if they can be traded quickly and at a low cost. In recent 
years market participants have experienced severe liquidity shocks and we have seen huge 
changes in investors’ abilities to trade high-quality assets, such as investment-grade bonds 
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and bonds issued by U.S. government-sponsored enterprises. This is why we must pay 
attention to the liquidity of securities.  
 
A relatively large number of research studies have focused on share liquidity, Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986), Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and 
Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) are a few names to be mentioned. The first and very 
significant study of liquidity in asset pricing was that of Amihud and Mendelson (1986). They 
showed that liquidity had a positive effect on asset return. I will discuss these studies in a 
more detailed fashion later on. Now I turn to liquidity costs. 
  
3.1 Liquidity costs 
 
The subject under discussion concerns liquidity costs that investors encounter when they trade 
less liquidity securities. Liquidity costs are costs associated with executing a transaction in 
capital markets. Amihud and Mendelson (2008) divided these liquidity costs into three major 
components. 
 
(1) First, direct trading costs. These kinds of costs are the most obvious ones. 
Direct trading costs consist of brokerage commissions, exchange fees, and taxes. 
 
(2) Second, price-impact costs. These costs can potentially be quite large. Price-
impact costs reflect the price concession that a buyer or seller must make to 
effect a trade. That means a premium on the price when buying and a discount 
on the price when selling.  
 
Price-impact costs increase with the degree of information asymmetry between 
buyers and sellers. If there is a large disparity of information between trading 
parties there is also a risk that the party initiating the trade will take advantage of 
its counterparty. When taking this into consideration, the counterparty requires a 
compensation for doing the trade. Greater asymmetry of information results in a 
larger price-impact and a higher cost of trading. 
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Inventory risk is another factor that affects price-impact costs. Inventory risks 
are risks associated with a holding period. When market-makers buy a stock, 
they need to hold it in an inventory until buyers appear. During that period, they 
bear the risk that the price will fall by the time they sell it. 
 
(3) Third, search and delay costs. Search and delay costs are the opportunity 
costs of not trading when traders are searching for better prices than those 
quoted on the market or when they try to avoid price-impact costs. By avoiding 
price-impact costs they try to work an order to reduce its price impact. To be 
brief, the investor can bear the search and delay costs when the trade is not 
executed immediately. 
 
3.2 Measuring liquidity  
 
Liquidity is a multidimensional phenomenon and an elusive concept. It can be hard to 
measure liquidity because there is not a single measure that captures the numerous aspects of 
liquidity. Aitken and Winn (see Aitken and Comerton-Forde, 2003) reported that there are 
about 68 extant liquidity measures used in literature and that there is no agreement to which is 
the best measure to use. Liquidity measures can be divided into two broad categories: trade-
based and order-based measures (Aitken and Comerton-Forde, 2003). 
 
Trade-based measures are commonly used in previous literature. Trading value, trading 
volume, number of trades and turnover ratio are included in this category.  According to 
Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2003) these measures are simply used to calculate readily 
available data and they are widely accepted among market professionals. However, trade-
based measures reflect ex post liquidity and this induces the fact that they are perhaps the 
most problematic measures. They indicate what people have traded in the past but not how 
they will trade in the future.  
 
Order-based measures, according to Aitken and Comerton-Forde, capture revenues and costs 
that are associated with immediate trading. Bid-ask spreads represent order-based measures. 
For small investors this is an effective and accurate method of calculating the liquidity of a 
stock. For larger investors this measure may underestimate the true costs of trading and 
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overestimate liquidity. A more complete measure of liquidity must also consider the market 
impact and opportunity costs of trading, especially for large trades. This requires an analysis 
of the volume of orders available at each price step. According to the example of Aitken and 
Comerton-Forde (2003), if an investor wants to purchase 100,000 units of stock and there is 
only 10,000 units available at the best ask, then the investor must increase his / her price until 
there is adequate volume in the order book to absorb the complete order. This means that the 
investor incurs the market impact costs. The market is therefore less liquid than the bid-ask 
spread would suggest. In some cases it can be impossible to get data for order-based 
measures, in particular bid and ask prices.  
 
I will present three liquidity measures next. These three are the bid-ask spread, turnover ratio 
and Amihud liquidity.  The latter two are trade-based measures and the former mentioned is 
an order-based measure.  
 
3.2.1 The bid-ask spread 
 
The bid-ask spread refers to the difference between selling and buying prices on the market. 
This is the difference in price between the lowest price for which a seller is willing to sell and 
the highest price that a buyer is willing to pay for an asset. The difference between ask and 
bid prices may come from e.g. above-mentioned price-impact costs. So if the bid-ask spread 
is greater than zero then investors may be exposed to asymmetric information and inventory 
risk. Bid-ask spreads were suggested as a measure of liquidity by Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986). They stated that the bid-ask spread is a natural measure of illiquidity because it is a 
sum of buying premium and selling concession. The bid-ask spread, as a percentage of the 
stock price, has been found to be negatively correlated with liquidity characteristics such as 
the trading volume, the number of shareholders, and  the number of market makers trading 
stocks. 
 
The bid-ask spread can be expressed by the following formulas: 
 
The quoted spread is a direct measure of market liquidity. The quoted spread is a valid 
measure, if the considered time period is relatively short, and assets are traded in one 
currency. Quoted spreads however are not comparable if the time period is long and the real 
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value of the currency changes e.g. due to inflation, or if the trade is executed in different 
currencies. 
 
Quoted spread: b
ti
a
titi PPQS ,,, −=  ,   (3)
     
where atiP ,  and 
b
tiP ,  are ask and bid quotes of asset i at time t . 
 
The relative spread is comparable. In this case liquidity may be compared across stocks with 
different prices. 
 
Relative spread: 
m
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where mtiP ,  is the mid price for asset i  at time t. 
 
The effective spread is the difference between the actual selling price and the halfway point 
between bidding and asking prices quoted at the time of the sale. This value is doubled to 
capture the whole bid/offer spread. The effective spread calculates how much above the 
midpoint price someone paid on a buy order and how much below the midpoint price 
someone received on a sell order. The effective spread measures the actual execution cost 
paid by the trader. 
 
 
Effective spread: ESi,t  ( ) ( )mtiti PP ,, lnln2 −×= ,  (5) 
 
where Pi,t is the transaction price for asset i at time t and mtiP ,  is the midpoint of the most 
recently posted bid and ask quotes for asset i. Equation (3) is borrowed from Goyenko, 
Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) and they have used the natural logarithm.  
 
Even though the bid-ask spread is a widely used measure of liquidity, it has certain 
shortcomings. One shortcoming is that it measures the cost of selling small numbers of shares 
well, but it does not necessarily measure the cost of selling large numbers of shares as good. 
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According to Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) the bid-ask spread is a noisy measure of 
liquidity because large trades tend to occur outside the spread while small trades tend to occur 
inside the spread. The other shortcoming comes from availability. The bid-ask spread is based 
on market microstructure data, which is not available for a long period of time.  
 
3.2.2 The turnover ratio 
 
The turnover ratio uses data on volume and it considers the intuition of a frequently traded 
asset being liquid. It is the ratio of trading volume to the number of shares outstanding. The 
turnover ratio is often used to compare liquidity across markets. The turnover ratio is used as 
a proxy of liquidity quite widely, Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001) to name 
one study, used it when they found a significant cross-sectional relation between stock returns 
and the variability of liquidity. Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2007) also used it when they 
analyzed the relationship between liquidity and dividend payers over time. 
 
 
ti
ti
ti SO
ST
TRratioTurnover
,
,
,
= ,   (6) 
 
where tiST ,  and tiSO ,  are share trading volumes and the number of shares outstanding 
respectively of asset i at time t . This measure tells how many times a stock changes its owner 
and the higher the turnover ratio the more liquidity a stock has. 
 
As I mentioned earlier the turnover ratio is a trade-based measure. A potential disadvantage of 
the turnover ratio is that it measures ex post liquidity and this is not necessarily a good 
indication of what will be traded in the future. 
 
3.2.3 Amihud illiquidity 
 
Recent studies, some of which include Amihud (2002), Acharya and Pederson (2005), Norli, 
Ostergaard and Schindele (2009), have used Amihud illiquidity as a measure of liquidity – or 
illiquidity – quite many times. Perhaps one reason for this is that the data can be obtained 
easily from daily stock data for long periods of time in most stock markets. As I mentioned 
 35 
data needed for bid-ask spreads is not available in many stock markets, especially for a long 
period of time. 
 
Amihud (2002) defines the illiquidity of stock i as the average ratio of the daily absolute 
return to the (euro-denominated) trading volume on that day, 
iyd
iyd
VOLE
R
. iydR  is the return on 
stock i on day d of year y and iydVOLE  is the respective daily volume in euro. This ratio gives 
the absolute (percentage) price change per euro of daily trading volume, or the daily price 
impact of the order flow. 
 
Each stock i the annual average is: 
 
 ∑
=
=
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R
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1
/1 ,  (7) 
 
where iyD  is the number of days for which data is available for stock i  in year y. The 
intuition behind this illiquidity measure is as follows; a stock is illiquid if it has a high value 
of Amihud illiquidity when the stock’s prices move a lot in response to little volume. 
 
Amihud (2002) empirically showed that ILLIQ is positively and strongly related to 
microstructure estimates of illiquidity which include measures of price impact and fixed 
trading costs over a time period.  A potential disadvantage of Amihud illiquidity is that it may 
be difficult to distinguish liquidity from volatility. If volatility does not move closely together 
with the trading volumes, stocks with high volatility will tend to be classified as illiquid 
stocks by the Amihud measure. 
 
These measures of liquidity as well as the illiquidity measures presented in this chapter 
measure different aspects of liquidity. It is doubtful that there could only be one measure to 
capture all of the elusive aspects of liquidity. 
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3.3 Expected return 
 
I will present various studies which have pondered the relationship between stock liquidity 
and its expected return. The pioneer study in this area was Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) 
study about asset pricing and the bid-ask spread. They found that asset returns to holders 
increased with the spread. If investors value securities, according to their returns net of 
trading costs, then they should require a higher expected return for higher spread stocks in 
order to compensate for the highest cost of trading. They also concluded that there is a 
clientele effect, where stocks with higher spreads are held by investors with longer holding 
periods. Investors with shorter holding periods will be willing to pay more to acquire low-
spread securities than investors with longer holding periods, because the latter can amortize 
the spread cost over a longer period. In 2002 Amihud also discovered that over time, expected 
market illiquidity positively affects ex ante stock excess returns. He suggested that expected 
stock excess returns partly represent an illiquidity premium. In this study he created the 
Amihud illiquidity measure that I described above. 
 
After Amihud and Mendelson’s studies about the relationship between expected returns and 
liquidity many other researchers have continued their work. Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) 
stated that expected returns are related cross-sectionally to the sensitivities of stock returns to 
innovations in aggregate liquidity. They found that the stocks that are more sensitive to 
aggregate liquidity have substantially higher expected returns, even after they account for 
exposures to the market return as well as size, value, and momentum factors. They studied the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as well as the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and 
found out that from 1966 through 1999, the average return on stocks with high sensitivities to 
liquidity exceeded that for the stocks with low sensitivities by 7.5 percent annually. They 
concentrated on an aspect of liquidity associated with temporary price fluctuations induced by 
order flow. 11  
 
 
11
 The basic idea with the order flow is that if signed volume is viewed roughly as “order flow” then the lower 
liquidity is reflected in a greater tendency for the order flow in a given direction on day d to be followed by a 
price change in the opposite direction on day d + 1. Essentially, lower liquidity corresponds to stronger volume-
related return reversals, and in this respect Pástor and Stambaugh’s liquidity measure follows the same line of 
reasoning as the model and empirical evidence presented by Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993). 
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Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001) found a negative and significant cross-
sectional relationship between average stock returns and the level of trading activity. Their 
data consisted of a sample of common stock of the NYSE and AMEX-listed companies from 
January 1966 to December 1995. They used trading activity as a proxy for liquidity. They 
studied the same stock market as Pástor and Stambaugh did and their period of time was 
almost the same as Pástor and Stambaugh had. Although the liquidity measures differed, their 
results are consistent with Pástor and Stambaugh’s results. To get an understanding of the 
magnitude of the liquidity effect on the expected return I have attached table 5 in which I 
present Chordia’s et al. results.  
 
Table 5 presents two sets of results, one in which a proxy for liquidity is the dollar trading 
volume and the other where a proxy for liquidity is the turnover.12 The results of table 5 state 
a strong book-to-market, momentum, (RET 2-3, RET 4-6 and RET 7-12 serve as proxies for 
momentum effects) and liquidity effects on excess returns. If we look more carefully at the 
effects liquidity has on excess returns, we can easily see that there is a strong relationship 
between them. The coefficient on DVOL is -0.177 with a t-statistic of -3.56 and the 
coefficient on TURN is -0.188 with a t-statistic of -3.74. Both DVOL and TURN are negative 
and statistically significant at the one-percent level. 
 
Like I mentioned earlier it may be difficult to distinguish liquidity from volatility. The 
standard deviation is highly correlated with the level of trading volume and it could 
contaminate the results. Because of that Chordia et al. have added measures of variability in 
liquidity.  They used a dimensionless quantity, the coefficient of variation in trading volume, 
as a measure of variability. The coefficient of CVVOL in the excess return regression is -
0.333 and that is strongly significant with a t-statistic of -5.1. The coefficient of CVTURN is -
0.367 and this is strongly significant with a t-statistic of -6.03 as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
12
 See more accurate definitions and calculations of variables in appendix 3. 
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Table 5 Excess returns and liquidity  
                     Dollar trading volume                      Turnover 
 
Excess returns                        Excess returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chordia et al. results of regressing excess returns on dollar tradind volume and turnover. t-values are in 
parentheses. 
* Significant at the five-percent level. ** Significant at the one-percent level. 
Source:Chordia et al. 2001, pp. 16 
INTERCEPT   0.719 0.718 
   (2.36)  (2.36) 
    
    
SIZE   0.081  0.102 ** 
   (1.42)  (3.18) 
    
    
BM   0.222 **  0.226 ** 
   (4.50)  (4.57) 
       
 
PRICE   0.102  0.089 
   (0.94)  (0.81) 
 
 
DVOL   -0.177 **   
   (-3.56) 
 
 
TURN     -0.188 ** 
     (-3.74) 
 
 
YLD   -1.80  -1.68 
   (-1.20)  (-1.10) 
 
 
RET 2-3   0.958 **  0.944 ** 
   (3.11)  (3.08) 
 
     
RET 4-6   0.894 **  0.866 ** 
   (3.39)  (3.29) 
 
 
RET 7-12   1.12 **  1.10 ** 
   (7.13)  (7.00) 
 
 
CVVOL   -0.33 ** 
   (-5.10) 
 
 
CVTURN     -0.367 ** 
     (-6.03) 
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3.4 Asset pricing with liquidity risk 
 
The next matter I wish to show revolves around Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) findings on 
how asset prices are affected by liquidity risks and the commonality in liquidity. The previous 
section stated that the expected return increases with illiquidity, but now I want to discuss this 
connection more specifically. Why does the expected return increase exactly? The study of 
Acharya and Pedersen presented a simple theoretical model that helps explain how asset 
prices are affected by liquidity risk and commonality in liquidity. Their model provides 
unified theoretical framework that can explain the empirical findings that average liquidity is 
priced (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986), that return sensitivity to market liquidity is priced 
(Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003) and that liquidity commoves with returns and predicts future 
returns (Chordia et al., 2001). 
 
Acharya and Pedersen have derived a liquidity-adjusted version of the capital asset pricing 
model. To state it briefly one has to find out how an asset’s expected (gross) return, 
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depends on its relative illiquidity costs, 
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on the market return, 
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and on the relative market illiquidity, 
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where iS is the total shares of security i, itC is illiquidity costs, 
i
tD  is the dividend of security i 
and itP is a share price.  
 
In the liquidity-adjusted CAPM the expected return of an asset is increasing in its expected 
illiquidity and its net beta. The net beta can be decomposed into a standard market beta and 
three betas representing different forms of liquidity risks. Liquidity risks are associated with: 
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(1) the commonality in liquidity with market liquidity, cov(ci,cm); (2) the return sensitivity to 
market liquidity , cov(ri, cm); and, (3) the liquidity sensitivity to market returns, cov(ci,rm), 
where ri, ci are the return and illiquidity costs of an asset, and rm and cm are the market return 
and market illiquidity costs respectively. 
 
In the unique linear equilibrium, the conditional expected gross return of asset i is 
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where .)( 11 premiumrisktheisrcrE fMtMttt −−= ++λ    
   
This equation states that the required return is a risk-free real return fr , plus the expected 
relative illiquidity cost, )( 1itt cE + , as Amihud  and Mendelson (1986) found theoretically and 
empirically (discussed above), plus four covariances times the risk premium. In the standard 
CAPM, the required return increases linearly with the covariance between the asset’s return 
and the market return, ),(cov 11 Mtitt rr ++ . The liquidity-adjusted CAPM yields three additional 
effects which could be regarded as the three forms of liquidity risks. According to Acharya 
and Pedersen (2005) these risks can be interpreted as follows. 
 
(1) The covariance between the asset’s illiquidity and market 
illiquidity, ),(cov 11 Mtitt cc ++ : The first effect is that the expected gross return 
increases with the covariance between the asset’s illiquidity and market 
illiquidity. This is the consequence of the compensation for holding an 
asset that becomes illiquid when the market in general becomes illiquid.  
 
(2) The covariance between the asset’s return and market illiquidity,  
),(cov 11 Mtitt cr ++ : The second effect is that the expected gross return 
decreases with the covariance between the asset’s return and market 
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illiquidity. This comes from the willingness of investors to accept a lower 
return on an asset with a high return in times of an illiquid market.  
 
(3) The covariance between the asset’s illiquidity and market return, 
),(cov 11 Mtitt rc ++ : The third effect is that the expected gross return decreases 
with the covariance between the asset’s illiquidity and market return. Now 
investors are willing to accept a lower expected return on an asset with 
low illiquidity costs in states of poor market return. When the market 
declines, the ability to sell easily is especially valuable. 
 
The required return of asset i is increasing in the covariance between its illiquidity and market 
illiquidity, ),(cov 11 Mtitt cc ++ , decreasing in the covariance between the asset’s return and market 
illiquidity, ),(cov 11 Mtitt cr ++ , and decreasing in the covariance between its illiquidity and market 
returns, ),(cov 11 Mtitt rc ++ . These three covariances provide a characterization of the liquidity risk 
of a stock. 
 
This section showed how liquidity risks affect asset pricing through the liquidity-adjusted 
capital asset pricing model. The liquidity-adjusted CAPM provides useful framework for 
understanding the various channels through which liquidity risks may affect asset pricing. 
According to equation (12) illiquidity affects the expected return positively. In practice if 
investors hold illiquid shares they require a higher expected return on them than they would if 
the shares were more liquid. They wish that share prices would go up so that they could 
increase their return. Other investors however, also observe the illiquidity of the shares so 
they won’t trade at a premium rate. That is why investors do not expect share prices to go up 
and why they might pay more attention to the paid share price and their dividend yield. To 
increase the stock return (see equation 8) they buy stocks at a discount rate and expect the 
dividend yield to be high. Thus in the end of this chapter I will present how stock market 
liquidity affects a firm’s dividend policy.  
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3.5 Dividend policy with liquidity risk 
 
Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt (2007) investigated the link between firm dividend policy and 
stock market liquidity. Their study covered NYSE and AMEX firms from 1963 to 2003 and 
they found evidence that owners of less (more) liquid common stock are more (less) likely to 
receive cash dividends. First they argued that the investor’s demand for stocks paying cash 
dividends is positively related to the trading friction that investors face when creating 
homemade dividend. The trading friction refers to liquidity costs and homemade dividend is a 
form of income that comes from stocks sales. Thus in markets with trading friction or in other 
words illiquid markets, investors will have a greater demand for cash dividends from the 
stocks they hold since stocks that pay cash dividends allow investors to satisfy their liquidity 
needs with little or no trading. This will enable them to avoid trading friction. In a high liquid 
market however, investors can create homemade dividends cheaply and because of that they 
won’t require cash dividends as much as the owners of illiquid stock. In addition to the 
investors demand for cash dividends with illiquid stocks, Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt 
further hypothesized that the likelihood of a firm paying cash dividends is positively related to 
investor demand for dividend payments and therefore inversely related to the market liquidity 
of the firm’s stock. 
 
When Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt tested the relationship between a firm’s dividend policy 
and stock liquidity they used the annual share turnover, the annual traded dollar volume in the 
stock, the proportion of days with zero traded volume, and the illiquidity ratio to proxies for 
liquidity. They found a strong empirical relationship between the dividend policy of a firm 
and the liquidity of its common stock. There was a significant negative relationship between 
share turnovers and the probability of dividend. The results also showed that firms with 
higher illiquidity ratios are more likely to pay dividends. Similarly, firms with a lower trading 
volume and firms with a higher proportion of days with no trading are also more likely to pay 
dividends.  
 
Besides staring at the relationship between the dividend policy and stock liquidity it is also 
important to address the question of how investor’s demand for dividends translates into 
actual dividend policy. On the other hand, existing literature, e.g. Pástor and Stambaugh 
which I mentioned earlier, argued that stock market liquidity affects firm value both in cross-
section and also through time. According to this literature, stocks with higher liquidity levels 
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trade at a premium and have lower expected returns relative to stocks with lower liquidity 
levels and which are traded at a discount. However, firms can reduce investor dependence on 
the liquidity market by way of paying cash dividends because Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt 
(2007) found that investors when they are valuing firms, view cash dividends and stock 
market liquidity as substitutes. Firms that initiate dividend payments reduce the sensitivity of 
their returns to aggregate liquidity. Therefore firms with higher discount rates due to lower 
liquidity can raise their value by paying cash dividends.  
 
4 The relationship between family firms, share liquidity, and firm 
value 
 
In the second chapter I discussed family firms. Some researchers, Anderson and Reeb (2003), 
Amit and Villalonga (2006), and Sraer and Thesman (2007) to name a few, found that family 
firms outperform non-family firms. However, no consensus was reached among the existing 
literature, for example Millet et al. (2007) found no evidence of superior performances by 
family firms and Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found that family firms are less valuable 
than non-family firms. 
 
In chapter three I discussed liquidity. I presented the measures of liquidity and stated that 
liquidity is an elusive concept and there is no single measure to capture all its dimensions. 
One of the most significant points in the third chapter was that there are many studies about 
the negative relationship between expected returns and stock liquidity. Besides the expected 
return, illiquid stocks require more cash dividends than a liquid one. In the end I also 
presented Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt’s results (2005) of how stock liquidity affects a 
firm’s value through cash dividends. Now it is logical to take firm value into discussion. 
 
The next thing I will do is connect two concepts - a family firm and stock liquidity - to each 
other and consider how this combination affects firm value. First I will state couple of things 
about a family firm and their stock liquidity and then I will move on to liquidity and the effect 
it has on firm value.  
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4.1 Family firms and liquidity 
 
In chapter two I presented the definition of a family firm. According to this definition a firm 
is a family firm if a family or a member of the family or relative owns 25 percent of the 
voting rights. Hence at least a quarter of the firm’s shares have to belong to a family - if we 
assume that one share justifies one voting right – and these shares are not available for 
trading. Weaker availability of the firm’s stocks leads to lower liquidity. Because of that we 
can assume that a family firm’s stocks have lower liquidity than those of a firm which has 
dispersed ownership.  
 
The liquidity of a family firms’ share is quite obvious if we use for example trading volume 
as a measure of liquidity. If we use Amihud illiquidity, the share is illiquid if its price moves a 
lot in response to little volume. The share of a non-family firm can also be illiquid if its price 
moves a lot. In this case the shares of a family firm are, in all likelihood, more illiquid than 
the ones of a non-family firm because the divisor in the Amihud illiquidity measure is trading 
volume. 
 
4.2 Liquidity and firm value 
 
The theory of corporate finance has mostly been based on the idea that a company’s market 
value is determined mainly by just two variables. These variables are 1) a company’s 
expected after-tax operating cash flows or earnings and 2) the risks associated with producing 
them. The measures of these risks reflect the volatility of operating cash flow and they exist in 
most asset pricing models. However, there is another important factor affecting a firm’s value. 
Amihud and Mendelson (2008) have noted that the liquidity of a company’s own securities 
affect the firm’s value outstandingly. Researchers consistently came to the same conclusion; 
the lower the liquidity of a stock – after controlling for risk and other relevant characteristics 
– the higher its expected return. This also means that the price of illiquid stocks might be 
lower. In their study in 1986 Amihud amd Mendelson estimated the effects of liquidity on 
actual average stock returns which were then viewed as a proxy for expected returns. If we do 
the same and look at equation (8) we can easily see that a lower value of itP 1−  increases the 
actual return or expected return. The higher a stock’s expected return, the lower its price is for 
any given level of expected cash flow or earnings. This means that illiquid stocks are traded at 
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a discount rate. If we use Tobin’s q or the P/E-ratio to measure firm value they will decrease 
when the stock price declines. In both of these measures share price is in the divisible term. 
The consequences of lower liquidity are described in the figure 1.  
 
Loderer and Roth (2005) investigated the price discount for limited liquidity. On the contrary 
to previous studies that have examined the relationship between returns and liquidity they 
looked directly at current stock discounts. They analyzed data from the Swiss exchange and 
the NASDAQ during 1995-2001. After controlling the earnings growth, risk, and firm size, 
they found a statistically and economically significant relationship between price and liquidity 
in both markets. They measured a stock’s liquidity with the relative bid-ask spread. The same 
conclusion follows when they used trading volume as an alternative liquidity proxy. Fang, 
Noe, and Tice (2009) also stated that liquidity affects a firm’s value positively. Their study 
showed that liquidity affects firm performance positively when performance is measured with 
a firm’s Tobin’s q ratio.  
 
4.3 The value of a family firm 
 
According to the two previous sections family firms should be less valuable than non-family 
firms, for family firms’ stocks have lower liquidity and lower liquidity indices a decrease in 
firm value, holding other characteristics equal of course. Fang, Noe, and Tice’s (2009) study 
implied a positive relation between stock liquidity and market-price based measures such as 
Tobin’s q. Under these circumstances family firms should have a lower Tobin’s q than non-
family firms. However, in chapter two according to previous studies I stated that family firms’ 
have a higher Tobin’s q than non-family firms. Is a Finnish family firm a better market 
performer than a non-family firm or does weak liquidity affect a family firm’s value to the 
point that family firms are worse performers than non-family firms after all. That is the 
subject of my next chapter. 
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Figure 1 The consequences of the decrease of share liquidity 
 
 
 
5 Empirical analysis: evidence of Finnish family firms and share 
liquidity 
 
The rest of my master’s thesis is about my empirical analysis of Finnish listed companies. 
There are three important concepts – firm value, a family firm, and share liquidity – the first 
one is a dependent variable, and the latter two are independent variables in my regression 
analyses. In section 5.2 I find out how concentrated ownership affects firm value and after 
that in section 5.3 I heighten my investigation and take stock liquidity into account. 
 
5.1 Data description  
 
For my investigation, I use firms that are listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange at the 
moment (February 2010). Financial firms, however, are discarded due to problems calculating 
Tobin’s q and a lack of comparability concerning other control variables. My dataset is a 
Liquidity  
falls 
The required 
return goes 
up 
Stock price 
goes down 
Tobin’s q and 
P/E-ratio falls 
Firm value 
goes down 
 47 
panel of Finnish listed firms over the period of 1997-2008 which is little bit longer than Sraer 
and Thesmar’s (1994-2000) and Anderson and Reeb’s (1994-1999) research periods. The 
construction of this data set used three different sources. First, I hand-collected information 
on firm ownership and ages using the firms’ annual reports and Web sites. Second, I retrieved 
the annual firm accounts from Thomson Financial Worldscope. Finally, I used Helsinki Stock 
Exchange’s websites to retrieve daily stock prices and find out the volume of stock in each 
firm.  
 
Figure 2 presents nine different sectors to which the firms on the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
have separated. NASDAQ OMX Nordic divides firms into ten different sectors but because I 
excluded the financial sector from my study only nine sectors are under consideration. The 
Industrials sector is the largest one. 38 percent of my sample firms are within the Industrials 
sector. Information technology is second to the industrial sector with a 24 percentage value. 
The other sectors involved are Consumer discretionary (15%), Materials (9%), Consumer 
staples (6%), Health care (5%), Telecommunication services (1%), Utilities (1%), and Energy 
(1%). 
 
Figure 2 Sector description 
 
 
Sector
Information technology
Industrials
Consumer discretionary
Materials
Health care
Telecommunication services
Consumer staples
Utilities
Energy
 
Source: Panel of Finnish listed firms over 1994-2008 
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5.1.1 Family firms on the Finnish stock market 
 
I state my definition of a family firm in chapter two. I use the Finnish Family Firms 
Association’s definition which defines a firm as a family firm if a family, a member of the 
family, or relative owns at least 25 percent of the firm’s voting rights. I hand-collected 
information on firm ownership to investigate firms’ major shareholders using their annual 
reports.13 I also use the Finnish Family Firms Association’s web site as help. During the 
period of 1997 to 2008 I found that out of 108 listed firms on the Helsinki Stock Exchange 27 
are family firms, 74 are non-family firms and seven firms changed their status from family 
firms to non-family firms or vice versa. In table 6 we can see that 27% of all firms present in 
the sample are family firms.14 This is a smaller number compared to what previous studies 
found. Anderson and Reeb (2003) found 35% to be family-controlled firms and Sraer and 
Thesmar (2007) found 70% of all firms in their sample to be family firms, although they used 
a different definition of family ownership. My definition of a family firm is slightly stricter 
than their definitions are. Line two of table 6 highlights the relatively small size of family 
firms since in weighted terms, non-family firms account for almost 85 percent of all firms. 
 
 
Table 6 Presence of family firms  
 
 Family firm Non-family firm   
Fraction (non weighted) 0.267 0.733 1 
Fraction (asset weighted) 0.156 0.844 1 
Firms 27 74 101 
Source: Panel of Finnish listed firms over 1997-2008 
 
 
Table 7 shows us the systematic differences between family firms and non-family firms.15 I 
calculate the annual averages of the different characteristics of family and non-family firms. I 
also take sales, ROE, ROA, and sales growth into account which are not included in my 
regression analyses. On average family firms are younger than non-family firms. When 
looking at accounting profitability, family firms do better than non-family firms. However, on  
 
 
13
 See division in appendix 4. 
14
 The table excluded seven firms which changed their status from family to non-family or vice versa. 
15
 The table excluded seven firms which changed their status from family to non-family or vice versa. 
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average non-family firms grow faster than family firms. The difference is not remarkable but 
it is not in the favour of family firms like it is in previous studies (Sraer and Thesmar, 
2007).The dividend yield for a family firm is larger than for a non-family firm. That fact is 
consistent with previous studies. As I mentioned in chapter three, firms with higher discount 
rates due to lower liquidity can raise their values by paying cash dividends, and Amihud 
illiquidity which is my liquidity measure in the second regression analysis is larger for family 
firms than it is for non-family firms. In other words a non-family firm’s share is more liquid 
than a family firm’s share. Both value measures – Tobin’s q and P/E-ratio – are smaller for 
family firms than they are for non-family firms.  
 
 
Table 7 Characteristics of family firms  
 
 
 All firms Family firm Non-family firm 
Age 73.13 68.77 74.73 
Sales (000,000€) 1359.99 412.43 1705.73 
Total Assets (000,000€) 1227.95 289.83 1570.23 
ROE -0.67 10.14 -4.62 
ROA 5.79 7.8 5.05 
Sales growth (%) 22.77 17.11 24.84 
Debt / Assets (%) 24.05 23.73 24.16 
Total liabilities (000,000€) 702.25 240.75 870.64 
Dividend yield (%) 3.65 4.24 3.44 
Tobin's q 2.22 1.36 2.54 
P/e-ratio 56.44 37.97 63.17 
Amihud illiquidity (*100) 0.21 0.26 0.19 
Firms 101 27 74 
Source: Panel of Finnish listed firms over 1997-2008 
 
Table 8 states descriptive information for my sample of firms. It provides means, medians, 
standard deviations, and maximum and minimum values for all variables in my sample. In 
terms of market performance, Tobin’s q has a mean value of 1.7773 and the mean for Ln(P/E-
ratio) is 3.4166. Before I took the natural logarithm of P/E-ratios, the standard deviation of the 
P/E-ratio in particular was very high since a few firms have a remarkably high P/E-ratio. It 
stems from very low earnings per share, e.g. EPS was 0.01. So I excluded the P/E-ratios 
which have a value of more than 2000 and in which the EPS was 0.01 to avoid distortion. 
After that I took the natural logarithm of the P/E-ratios and consequently I discarded negative 
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P/E-ratios. This is part of the reason why Tobin’s q is my primary value measure but I also 
check how the results change if I use an alternative value measure. The alternative value 
measure is P/E-ratio. Minimum Ln(Firm age) is 0. That is consequence of the fact that some 
firms are founded during the sample period. When they are one year old the natural logarithm 
of that age is zero. 
 
Table 8 Summary statistics for the full sample 
 
 
 
Ln(Firm 
age) 
Ln(Total 
assets) 
(000,000€) 
Debt/ 
assets 
(%) 
Stock 
return 
volatility  
Dividend 
yield 
(%) 
Amihud 
illiquidity 
(*100) 
Tobin's 
q 
Ln(P/E-
ratio) 
Mean 3.6890 5.0468 23.6724 0.4844 3.7146 0.1836 1.7773 3.4166 
Median 3.8067 4.6991 22.2107 0.3754 3.3483 0.1351 1.1279 3.0766 
Maximum 6.5511 10.5353 238.723 4.7694 31.6406 6.6949 48.5599 7.5512 
Minimum 0.0000 0.1454 0.01 0.1589 0.0000 0.0476 0.1562 -1.5465 
Standard 
Deviation 1.0281 2.0305 19.7804 0.4368 3.3489 0.2702 2.7530 1.3510 
Observations 1 262 1 203 1 196 1 296 974 1 292 1 125 832 
 
This table provides summary statistics for the data employed in my analysis. The data set is comprised of 108 
firms during 1997-2008 on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Firm size is Ln(total assets) which is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. I proxy Firm age using the natural logarithm of the number of 
years since firms report the year they are found on their websites. The leverage is Debt/assets that is measured as 
the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets. Firm risk is Stock return volatility and it is 
defined as the annual standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns. Dividend yield is the dividend per share 
divided by the calendar year closing price. Share liquidity is measured with Amihud illiquidity. Amihud 
illiquidity is calculated as follows: the sum of the natural logarithm of daily absolute return to the natural 
logarithm of (euro-denominated) trading volume divided by the number of days for which data is available. Firm 
value is Tobin’s q and Ln(P/E-ratio). Tobin’s q is the ratio of  the firm’s market value to book value and is 
calculated as follows: ((common share outstanding*calendar year closing price)+liabilities book value)) divided 
by (equity book value+liabilities book value). Ln(P/E-ratio) is calculated as follows: average on daily share 
prices divided by earning per share.  
   Source: Panel of Finnish listed firms over 1997-2008 
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5.2 Family ownership and firm market performance 
 
My main interest in this part is the relationship between a family firm and firm performance. 
Given that family firms tend to have different ages and sizes than non-family firms, it is 
necessary to conduct a multivariate analysis. My empirical strategy contains a panel data 
analysis since the order of the data has a meaning as well as the values. I use fixed effects on 
years so I get dummies for each year. I use a two-way fixed effects model for each sector as 
well. I did not use fixed effects on firm-level because by doing so I would not get an 
appropriate estimate on the family firm dummy. The regression equation that I employ for my 
multivariate analysis follows the equation adapted by Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Sraer 
and Thesmar (2007), and it is as follows: 
 
 
 
Firm performance = δ0 + δ1 (Family Firm) + δ2 (Control variables) +  (13) 
δ3-10 (Sector) + δ97-08 (Year dummy variables) + ε  
 
 
 
where, 
 
Firm performance = Tobin’s q (and Ln(P/E-ratio)), 
 
Family Firm = binary variable that equals one when the firm is a family firm and otherwise 
zero, 
 
Control variables = the natural logarithm of firm age, the natural logarithm of total assets, 
total debt divided by total assets, and stock return volatility, 
 
Sector = 1.0 for each sector in my sample except industrials sector which is 0-dummy, 
 
Year dummy variables = period fixed dummy variables. 
 
My data spans from 1997 to 2008. I control for heteroskedasticity using  White cross-section 
standard errors.  
 
Table 9 presents results using market performance measures as dependent variables. When 
focusing on column 1 we can see that family ownership harms firm performance. The  
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Table 9 Market performance of family firms 
 
                           Tobin’s q                       Ln(P/E-ratio)  
 
(1)                                              (2) 
INTERCEPT    2.4764  2.9321 
    (5.3640)  (11.8729) 
 
FAMILY FIRM   -0.5914 **  -0.0017  
    (-2.6676)  (-0.0184) 
 
CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY  -0.1049  0.0488 
    (-0.7581)  (0.5626) 
 
CONSUMER STAPLES   -0.3101 **  -0.5938 ** 
    (-2.8687)  (-4.6145) 
 
ENERGY    0.4064 *  -0.2429 
    (2.0918)  (-0.5784) 
 
HEALTH CARE   2.0868  -2.2200 ** 
    (1.5140)  (-4.6109) 
 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY  0.9658 **  -0.0516 
    (2.9388)  (-0.3108) 
 
MATERIALS    0.0233  -0.2846 * 
    (0.1390)  (-2.1637) 
 
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES  0.4413 **  -0.4973 
    (3.2300)  (-1.3348) 
 
UTILITIES    0.0460  -0.2582 * 
    (0.1053)  (-1.9960) 
 
LN(FIRM AGE)   -0.0757  0.1842 ** 
    (-1.1867)  (4.6769) 
 
LN(TOTAL ASSETS) (000,000€)  -0.1245 *  -0.0195 
    (-2.1075)  (-0.8837) 
 
DEBT/ASSETS (%)   -0.0121  -0.0008 
    (-1.9605)  (-0.4456) 
 
STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY (*100)  0.8044  0.0191 
    (1.5100)  (0.1210) 
 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED   0.1281  0.1952 
 
 
Panel Least Squares regression results of regressing firm market performance on family ownership. 
This table reports the results of regressing firm performance on family ownership. The number of observations is 
1 104 when Tobin’s q is a dependent variable. The number of observations is 826 when the Ln(P/E-ratio) is a 
dependent variable.   
* Significant at the five-percent level. ** Significant at the one-percent level. 
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coefficient estimate on a family firm is negative and significant at the one-percent level. 
Family firms are weaker market performers than non-family firms. The difference in Tobin’s 
q is 0.5914 percentage points. This means that when a firm changes its status from a non-
family firm to a family firm, holding other variables constant, Tobin’s q decreases by 0.5914 
units. The coefficient estimate on a family firm is 22 percent of Tobin’s q standard deviation 
which is 2.753. We can say that it is economically significant. The explanatory power – 
adjusted R-squared –  is 0.1281. This means that explanatory variables explain 12.81% of the 
variability in the dependent variable; Tobin’s q. Firm size exhibits a significant and negative 
association to a firm’s value as well. A firm’s age, however, is insignificant. In the alternative 
value measure - P/E-ratio – the column indicates that family firms have no effect on the firm’s 
value. A notable observation concerning P/E-ratio is that a firm’s age has a positive and 
significant effect on P/E-ratio. 
 
5.3 The liquidity of a family firm’s share and firm market performance 
 
My focus in this section is to figure out the relationship between share liquidity and firm’s 
market performance. Once again my primary value measure is Tobin’s q, but I also look at the 
changes in the results when using P/E-ratio as a dependent variable. New variables that I 
introduce here are Amihud illiquidity and dividend yield. I use Amihud illiquidity to measure 
share illiquidity. I also take the dividend yield into account by following existing literature. 
The mean Amihud illiquidity is 0.1836 and the mean dividend yield is 3.7146 according to 
table 8.  
 
The regression equation that I employ for my multivariate analysis follows the equation 
adapted by Chordia et al. (2001), Loderer and Roth (2005), and the previous equations (13) 
and it is as follows: 
 
Firm performance 
= δ0 + δ1(Family Firm) + δ2(Amihud illiquidity) + δ3(Family firm’s share illiquidity)   (14)
  
+ δ4 (Control variables) + δ5-12 (Sector) + δ97-08 (Year dummy variables) + ε 
 
where, 
 
Firm performance = Tobin’s q (and Ln(P/E-ratio)), 
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Family Firm = binary variable that equals one when the firm is a family firm and otherwise 
zero, 
 
Amihud illiquidity = the natural logarithm of Amihud illiquidity, 
 
Family firm’s share illiquidity = Family firm –binary variable multiplied by Amihud 
illiquidity, 
 
Control variables = the natural logarithm of firm age, the natural logarithm of total assets, 
total debt divided by total assets, stock return volatility, and dividend yield, 
 
Sector = 1.0 for each sector in my sample except industrials sector which is 0-dummy, 
 
Year dummy variables = period fixed dummy variables. 
 
Table 10 presents results using market performance measures as dependent variables. When 
focusing on column 1 we can see that the coefficient estimate on Amihud illiquidity is 1.8809. 
This is positive but not statistically significant with t-statistic of 0.8722. Due to the fact that I 
examine Amihud illiquidity and the illiquidity of a family firm’s share separately; Amihud 
illiquidity only measures the illiquidity of a non-family firm’s share. According to this, the 
illiquidity of a non-family firm’s share does not have a statistically significant effect on firm 
value. However, when considering a Family firm’s share illiquidity variable we can discover 
an inverse effect. The coefficient estimate on a Family firm’s share illiquidity is -4.8329 and 
it is significant at the one-percent level. The Family firm’s share illiquidity variable is an 
interaction term. It is zero when considering a non-family firm. When considering a family 
firm it is Amihud illiquidity multiplied by one. This means that if a family firm’s share 
illiquidity increases by one unit, Tobin’s q decreases by 0.02952 units, holding the other 
variables constant. I calculated this as follows: Amihud coefficient estimate minus Family 
firm’s share illiquidity coefficient estimate = 0.018809 - 0.048329.16 The illiquidity of a 
family firm’s share has a statistically significant effect on a firm’s value. The coefficient 
estimate on a family firm’s share illiquidity is 1.07 percent of Tobin’s q standard deviation 
which is 2.7530. The explanatory power – adjusted R-squared –  is 0.1793. This means that  
 
 
16 In the regression analysis I have multiplied Amihud illiquidity by 100. 
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Table 10 Market performance of family firm and share liquidity  
 
                           Tobin’s q                       Ln(P/E-ratio)  
 
(1)                                              (2) 
INTERCEPT    1.7634  4.2229 
    (3.5096)  (13.6649) 
FAMILY FIRM   0.6389 *  0.0298 
    (2.3120)  (0.1995) 
AMIHUD ILLIQUIDITY (*100)  1.8809  -2.6638 ** 
    (0.8722)  (-4.1205) 
FAMILY FIRM’S SHARE ILLIQUIDITY (*100) -4.8329 **  0.1628 
    (-3.1679)  (0.2696) 
CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY  -0.0255  -0.0062 
    (-0.1690)  (-0.0505)  
CONSUMER STAPLES   -0.2866 *  -0.5816 ** 
    (-1.9656)  (-5.8099) 
ENERGY    0.5292 **  -0.0855 
    (3.2188)  (-0.2003) 
HEALTH CARE   1.8251  -2.4852 ** 
    (1.3377)  (-6.8988) 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY  0.7324 **  -0.4155 ** 
    (3.0029)  (-2.8780) 
MATERIALS    0.0710  -0.3826 * 
    (0.4329)  (-2.2796) 
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES  0.4117  -0.3792 
    (1.7047)  (-0.9273) 
UTILITIES    0.4156  -0.0359 
    (1.0719)  (-0.2761) 
LN(FIRM AGE)   -0.0067  0.2045 ** 
    (-0.0900)  (5.5792) 
LN(TOTAL ASSETS) (000,000€)  -0.07328 *  -0.1087 ** 
    (-2.3831)  (-4.1173) 
DEBT/ASSETS (%)   -0.0159 *  -0.0039 ** 
    (-2.1349)  (-2.8483) 
STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY (*100)  1.3720  0.3425 * 
    (1.9279)  (2.5671) 
DIVIDEND YIELD (%)   -0.0909 **  -0.0937 ** 
    (-2.8990)  (-4.4832) 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED   0.1793  0.2941 
 
Panel Least Squares regression results of regressing firm market performance on family ownership.This table 
reports the results of regressing firm performance on family ownership. The number of observations is 953 when 
the Tobin’s q is a dependent variable. The number of observations is 928 when the P/E-ratio is a dependent 
variable.            
* Significant at the five-percent level. ** Significant at the one-percent level. 
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explanatory variables explain 17.93% of the variability in Tobin’s q. In the alternative value 
measure – Ln(P/E-ratio) – the column indicates that Amihud illiquidity has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on firm value. However, the illiquidity of a family firm’s share 
does not differ from the illiquidity of a non-family firm’s share. 
 
Table 11 provides correlations of my sample variables. As we can see the correlation between 
the stock return volatility and Amihud illiquidity is quite large. The correlation coefficient is 
0.5408. One of the disadvantages of the Amihud illiquidity measure is that it may be difficult 
to distinguish liquidity from volatility. If volatility is not closely linked to trading volumes, 
stocks with high volatility will tend to be classified as illiquid stocks by the Amihud measure. 
For example if the volatility of a stock increases but the trading volume does not, a stock is 
classified as illiquid. 
 
Table 11 Variables correlations 
 
 
 
Ln(Firm 
age) 
Ln(Total 
assets) 
Debt/ 
assets 
Stock 
return 
volatility 
Dividend 
yield 
Amihud 
illiquidity 
(*100) 
Tobin's 
q 
Ln(P/E-
ratio) 
Ln(Firm age) 1.0000        
Ln(Total 
assets) 
0.2601 1.0000       
Debt/assets 0.1297 0.2033 1.0000      
Stock return 
volatility 
-0.0782 -0.2015 0.0258 1.0000     
Dividend 
yield 
0.1079 0.0315 -0.0385 -0.0786 1.0000    
Amihud 
illiquidity 
-0.1323 -0.4082 0.0571 0.5408 0.0343 1.0000   
Tobin's q -0.1542 -0.1036 -0.1850 0.2474 -0.2426 0.0262 1.0000  
Ln(P/E-ratio) 0.1147 -0.0748 0.0078 0.0795 -0.1456 -0.0606 -0.0589 1.0000 
Source: Panel of Finnish listed firms over 1997-2008 
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5.4 Discussion 
 
To state it briefly the results from the regression analyses point out that a family firm’s value 
in the market is less than a non-family firm’s value and the liquidity of a family firm’s share 
has a negative and significant effect on firm value. I shall discuss these results next in a more 
detailed manner as well as try to find out their consistency with previous studies. 
 
5.4.1 The interpretation of family firm market performance 
 
The results from the regression indicate that family firms are worse market performers than 
non-family firms. In other words the value of family firms is significantly less than the value 
of non-family firms. My results are contrary to recently published literature e.g. Anderson and 
Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006) as well as Sraer and Thesmar (2007). I can also add 
one more study, which I have not mentioned before, to the list that concluded that family 
firms are better performers than non-family firms. Maury (2006) studied Western European 
firms and discovered that family firms are better market performers than non-family firms. I 
think the differences in the results could stem from the four following facts. 
 
First the definition that I use is stricter than the definitions of the above-mentioned studies. 
Sraer and Thesmar reported a firm as a family firm when the founder or a member of the 
founder’s family is a blockholder of the firm. Anderson and Reeb used the fractional equity 
ownership of the founding family and (or) the presence of family members on the board of 
directors to identify family firms. Villalonga and Amit initially defined family firms 
following Anderson and Reeb’s definition. Maury (2006) also had a looser definition than the 
one I use. Maury defined a firm as a family firm if the largest shareholder holds at least 10% 
of the voting rights. Villalonga and Amit examined how their results changed when they used 
different definitions. The definition closest to mine leads to the fact that there were no 
statistically significant differences between the performance of family firms and non-family 
firms. Miller et al. (2007) have also noticed the influence the definition of family firms has to 
the results.  
 
Second, my research period differs from the above-mentioned studies. When considering the 
research periods of these three studies - Sraer and Thesmar (1994-2000), Anderson and Reeb 
(1994-1999) and Villalonga and Amit (1994-2000) we can observe that they are all almost the 
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same. (Maury studied 1998.) They also take place during the time of the global boom in the 
late 1990s. The boom resulted partly from the powerful drive of the telecommunications 
industry and I am quite sure that some of those dot-com firms were included in the family 
firm category. Family firms were, according to Anderson and Reeb younger than non-family 
firms. This could possible indicate the fact that dot-com firms were present in their research. 
The coefficient estimate on firm age was negative and statistically significant. So young firms 
influenced the market performance in a positive way. 
 
Third, the value measures can be calculated differently. Sraer and Thesmar (2007) did not use 
Tobin’s q in their regression analysis at all. Their dependent variables were return on assets, 
return on equity, market to book, and dividend to profit. Anderson and Reeb (2003) used 
Tobin’s q and they estimated market values and replacement costs using Yermarck’s (1996) 
algorithm. The divisible term – the market value – is the same as I use but the divisor – the 
replacement cost – differs from the term that I use. I estimate the replacement cost by adding 
together the book value of equity and liabilities. Anderson and Reeb estimate, using 
Yermarck’s guideline, the replacement cost of inventories and fixed assets by recursive 
algorithms that take inflation into account, real depreciation rates, capital expenditures, and 
the method of inventory valuation used by each company. Other assets were assumed to have 
amarket value equal to book value.  
 
Fourth, Finnish family firms might simply have a lower value in the market. Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988) discovered that when majority blocks are sold, stock prices on average 
increase by an abnormal 12%. This verifies the statement that a family firm harms firm value 
throughout lower share prices. But what could be the reasons that induce the negative effect 
on firm value? An extensive answer to that question would require a whole new study. I have, 
however, taken one possible explanation into account. The answer to that is the liquidity of a 
family firm’s share. It is possible that the liquidity of a family firm’s share is weaker 
worldwide than a non-family firm’s share, but what is the total effect liquidity has on firm 
value? 
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5.4.2 The interpretation of market performance, family firms and share liquidity 
 
I came to the conclusion that the illiquidity of a family firm’s share has a negative effect on 
firm value. The negative effect of share illiquidity on firm value is consistent with previous 
studies and my expectations as well. These studies discovered the negative relationship 
between liquidity and the expected return (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986 as well as Pástor 
and Stambaugh, 2003). The illiquidity of a non-family firm’s share, however, does not affect 
firm value negatively. This is a very interesting fact to find out. The average Amihud 
illiquidity measure for a family firm is 0.26 and for a non-family firm 0.19 (see table 7). 
Family firms have, on average, larger share illiquidity but this does not explain why the 
illiquidity of a non-family firm’s share does not affect firm value negatively?  
 
Investors, in general, try to avoid illiquid shares and a family firm’s share generally is illiquid. 
When investors trade with illiquid shares they require a liquidity premium. I don’t know if 
investors categorize a family firm’s share as an illiquid-one and a non-family firm’s share as 
liquid but the results could confirm this argument. Why is it that the illiquid shares of a non-
family firm do not decrease firm value? To find some possible explanations to this question I 
have to return to a certain definition of Amihud illiquidity. The Amihud illiquidity measure is 
the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the trading volume. A stock is illiquid when 
the stock’s prices move a lot in response to little volume. A non-family firm’s shares which 
have large illiquidity generally have a lot of movement in prices. The total volume of a share 
has in general stayed at a quite stable rate. The share prices of a family firm that has large 
liquidity generally move a lot but the total volume is significantly less as well. For example, 
non-family firm X’s share illiquidity is 2 when measured by Amihud illiquidity, and family 
firm Y’s share illiquidity is also 2. It could be that firm X’s Amihud illiquidity is 4/2 = 2 but 
for firm Y Amihud illiquidity = 2/1 = 2. A non-family firm’s share is illiquid because its 
prices move a lot and a family firm’s share is illiquid because it has a low daily volume. It 
seems that investors pay more attention on a share’s total volume than in price movements. 
The fact that the Amihud illiquidity measure is highly correlated with volatility could have an 
effect on the fact that a non-family firm’s shares are classified as illiquid. Stocks with high 
volatility will tend to be classified as illiquid stocks. 
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5.5 The limitations of the study and leads for future studies 
 
There are some limitations to my study that might skew the results a bit. First, are the value 
measures that I use the right ones to measure firm value? I use Tobin’s q and the P/E-ratio 
which are commonly used value measures. Many studies about firm market performance used 
Tobin’s q as a value measure and a study about share liquidity used the P/E-ratio as a measure 
of firm value. Second, there are some constraints in my data. Finally I state a few words about 
leads for future studies. 
 
5.5.1 Value measures 
 
Many studies have used Tobin’s q as the measure to determine firm market performance 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003 and Villalonga and Amit, 2006) so the value measure I use is 
consistent with those studies as well. When I calculate Tobin’s q I use an annual share closing 
price because I use end of the year values for book values of equity and for liabilities as well. 
The closing price is not an exact value for the price of the whole year but I use it as a proxy. 
The mean Tobin’s q (see table 8) is larger than one which means that over a half of the firms 
earn excess profits. One disadvantage of Tobin’s q is that it can be influenced by a firm’s 
ownership structure. For example, a firm can contribute to the number by raising the amount 
of common share outstanding. On page 11 I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
Tobin’s q more deeply.  
 
Many investors follow firms’ P/E-ratios. The P/E-ratio is a simple measure since it is the 
share price divided by its earnings. According to Cinnamon and Helweg-Larsen (2006) the 
P/E-ratio is a measure of how long, at the current rate of earnings, a shareholder has to wait 
for his earnings (whether paid out as dividends or retained) to total the current price of the 
share. The P/E-ratio is a kind of rough payback per share. Price-to-earning is easily the most 
discussed and cited valuation measure in the investment world. However, as Hoover (2005) 
stated, the interpretation of the P/E-ratio is not that simple. Naïve investors cite a lower-than-
average P/E-ratio as evidence that a stock is undervalued. Instead, investors should interpret a 
lower-than-average P/E-ratio as evidence that the market believes the firm’s prospects are less 
attractive than average. We can only interpret a low P/E-ratio as evidence of underpricing if 
we develop independent evidence that the firm’s future prospects are more attractive than the 
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market believes they are. One source of error occurs when we compare firm’s P/E-ratios to 
each other.  For example, firm X reported earnings per share of 0.01€ for the year ending and 
the same time, the firm’s stock was trading at about 30€ per share, giving it a P/E-ratio of 
about 3 000€. If we were to include the firm in a peer group, the average P/E-ratio for that 
group would be affected in a dramatic way. According to Kallunki (Talouselämä, 2009) the 
P/E-ratio is useful when the value of the P/E-ratio is between 5 and 25. This is a problem that 
I encountered too. In table 7 we can easily see that the averages of both non-family firms and 
family firms are over 25.  
 
When taking the empirical analyses into consideration I came to the conclusion that Tobin’s q 
is a better value measure than the P/E-ratio. The reasons for this are the overgrown and 
negative P/E-ratios. The P/E-ratio is a good value measure when describing profitable and 
steadily grown firms. However my sample also consists of firms that obtain zero-profit or a 
loss. In addition the P/E-ratio does not tell anything about a firm’s liabilities which Tobin’s q 
does. Altogether the P/E-ratio cannot give an equally reliable picture of the situation as 
Tobin’s q can. This is why Tobin’s q is my primary value measure. 
 
5.5.2 Other Variables 
 
I had to make some assumptions and estimations to procure the data that I needed. I excluded 
P/E-ratios that were over 2000 and those where the divisor aka EPS was 0.01 and that is why 
the P/E-ratio was very high. I excluded four Tobin’s q:s that were over 100 as well. Three of 
these came from the same firm. I also had to estimate the share trading volume in some cases. 
I did this by multiplying the daily closing price by amount of trades. In the case of multiple 
share classes I used the data of a share which justifies one voting right per one share. It could 
also be that there is some other variable that affects a family firm’s value that is not included 
in the regression analyses. Investors’ lower appreciation towards family firms could stem 
from, for example, Agency Problem II. Large shareholders may use their controlling position 
in firms to extract private benefits at the expense of small shareholders. This could be one 
reason why family firms are less valuable than non-family firms. 
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5.5.3 Further studies 
 
In this master’s thesis I consider all family firms to be in one group. I did not separate firms 
depending on whether a founder, a descendant, or a professional manager serves as a CEO. 
That is why my data, in general, delivered results to the whole group in which a family, a 
member of the family, or relative owns at least 25 percent of the voting rights. This led me to 
the question of: Are there differences in results if we distinguish lone founder businesses from 
true family businesses like Miller et al. did? 
 
This thesis has focused only on one liquidity measure. It would be interesting to find out if the 
results are the same when using other liquidity measures, for example a measure that 
measures only volume i.e. trading volume and alternatively a measure that captures price-
impact costs i.e. bid-ask spread. 
 
At the end of this thesis I will focus on one particular Finnish family firm and see how the 
results I got this chapter can be applied to their case. Next chapter is about Lemminkäinen 
Oyj.  
 
6 Lemminkäinen Oyj 
 
The whole idea of this master’s thesis stemmed from a 100-year-old Finnish construction 
company, Lemminkäinen. Lemminkäinen was established in 1910 under the name of Asfaltti 
Osakeyhtiö Lemminkäinen in Helsinki by a group of entrepreneurial master builders. At first 
the company’s business was limited to waterproofing and bituminous yard and street works. 
The business expanded in 1916 when Finland gained its independence from Russia. 
Lemminkäinen opened its own roofing felt factory and about 10 years after that the 
company’s research and development work focused on asphalt production. After the Second 
World War, Lemminkäinen gradually achieved leadership of the Finnish asphalt paving 
market through organic growth and a number of significant acquisitions. Lemminkäinen’s 
strong growth began in the 1970s. In the middle of the 70s Lemminkäinen acquired a majority 
interest in Oy Alfred Palmberg Ab which became the center of Lemminkäinen’s building 
construction operations. Today it operates in all areas of the construction sector. 
Lemminkäinen Group’s operations have been organised into four business sectors. These four 
business sectors are building construction, infrastructure construction, technical building 
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services and building products. Lemminkäinen operates internationally but its main markets 
are in the Baltic Rim region. (www.lemminkainen.fi) 
 
6.1 Ownership history 
 
When a group of entrepreneurial master builders established Lemminkäinen in 1910 one of 
the people involved was Oskari Vilamo. Vilamo acquired the majority of the shares between 
World War I and II. Lemminkäinen truly became Vilamo’s life’s work. Vilamo had three 
children who divided Lemminkäinen’s shares equally in the distribution of the inheritance in 
1950. Oskari Vilamo was then followed by his son Heikki Vilamo (1922-1980) who was 
chosen to be the Chairman of the Board of Directors. Disputes within the family led to the 
shifting of share ownership from Oskari Vilamo to Eva Vilamo-Pentti in 1959. That same 
year Eva Vilamo-Pentti’s husband K.H Pentti became the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors. This is when the Pentti era began at Lemminkäinen. K.H Pentti worked as the 
Chairman of the Board of Directors until 1966 and again from 1978-1993. (Lemminkäinen-
konsernin sidosryhmälehti 3-2008) 
 
Heikki Pentti, the son of K.H Pentti and Eva Vilamo-Pentti, was a third generation owner at 
Lemminkäinen Oy. In 1983 he was appointed the CEO of the company and during his CEO 
period, which lasted until 1993, Lemminkäinen became one of the largest Finnish 
construction companies. In 1994 Heikki Pentti was appointed the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors succeeding his father and continued in this task until his death in 2008. 
(www.lemminkainen.fi) 
 
Heikki Pentti was one of the three sons Eva Vilamo-Pentti and K.H.Pentti had. The two other 
brothers are Erkki J. Pentti and Olavi Pentti. Erkki J. Pentti worked as a member of the Board 
of Directors from 1975 until he died in 2006. The end of 2008 the three brothers owned over 
half of Lemminkäinen’s shares. Today Lemminkäinen is the second largest construction 
company right after YIT Oyj. (www.lemminkainen.fi) 
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6.2 The history of Lemminkäinen’s share 
 
Next I will briefly present the history of Lemminkäinen’s share. In 1989 Lemminkäinen’s 
share was quoted on the OTC-list that is maintained by the Finnish Association of Securities 
Dealers. Lemminkäinen’s classification was other industries. On June 1, 1995, 
Lemminkäinen’s share was transferred to the official list of the Helsinki Exchange and from 
January 1, 1997, Lemminkäinen’s classification at the Helsinki Exchange was Construction 
Industry. Consequently Lemminkäinen became a public limited company on March 26, 1998 
and the name changed to Lemminkäinen Oyj. On July 1, 2005, the Helsinki Exchange 
adopted a new Global Industry Classification Standard as another step in the harmonization of 
the securities market of the Nordic and Baltic countries. Lemminkäinen´s classification 
became Industrials. (www.lemminkainen.fi) 
 
6.2.1 Price development 
 
In figure 3 I present Lemminkäinen’s share price development. In figure 3(b) and 3(c) price 
developments are described as relative to the average price development of the Industries 
sector and the average price development of OMX Helsinki. As it can been seen from figure 
3, on average, the price of a Lemminkäinen share has increased throughout. However, there 
are some decreases that can be seen in the end of 1998, in 2004, and in 2006 which was 
particularly sharp and it hit the bottom in the middle of 2006. 
 
Lemminkäinen’s price development relative to the average price development of the 
Industries sector can be seen in figure 3(b). Lemminkäinen’s price has constantly stayed 
above the average price of the Industries sector despite the fact that both price developments 
have advanced in a parallel way. They started to grow in 2004 and reached the top in the 
middle of 2007. After that the price development turned down.  
 
Figure 3(c) shows the price developments of Lemminkäinen and OMX Helsinki. Let’s look at 
the blue line first. The boom in the late 1990s can be easily observed in the graph. A few 
reasons for the boom were rapid economic growth, globalization, Nokia, the 
telecommunications cluster and the Dot-com bubble. After reaching the new Millennium the 
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Figure 3 Lemminkäinen’s share price development 
 
 
(a) Price development 
 
 
(b) Price development relative to the average price development of the sector Industries 
  
 
(c) Price development relative to the average price development of OMX Helsinki 
 
Source: Kauppalehti 2010  
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share price started to decline. Next we will look at the red line. We can find that the price of 
Lemminkäinen’s share did not react as heavily as the OMX Helsinki in the 1990s boom nor 
during the decline which came after that. From 1995 to 2006 Lemminkäinen’s share price was 
below the average share price but after 2006 it rose two times above the average share price. 
In late 2007 Lemminkäinen’s share price sank below the OMX Helsinki curve because of the 
strong impact the recession had on the construction industry.  
 
6.2.2 Share liquidity 
 
As it can be seen throughout the thesis, family firms have, on average, lower liquidity than 
non-family firms. If liquidity is measured simply with the turnover ratio then a family firms’ 
share liquidity is quite certainly weaker than the one of a non-family firms’. However, I have 
used Amihud illiquidity which I think is more valid and more descriptive than the basic 
turnover ratio to measure liquidity. Amihud illiquidity does not only measure the volume but 
also the absolute stock return. A stock is illiquid if the stock’s prices move a lot in response to 
little volume. Lemminkäinen’s share liquidity is described in Figure 4. For comparison in 
figure 4(a) I present Ramirent’s, Tamfelt’s, and YIT’s share liquidity as well. 
Lemminkäinen’s, Ramirent’s and Tamfelt’s shares are quoted on the Helsinki Exchange and 
each firm belongs to the mid cap and industrials -sector. YIT’s share is quoted on the Helsinki 
Exchange and it belongs to the industrials –sector as well, but YIT is a large cap firm. 
Ramirent, Tamfelt, and YIT are all non-family firms so when judging by figure 4 
Lemminkäinen as a family firm has reasonably good liquidity. Amihud illiquidity measures 
illiquidity so the lower the graph is the better share liquidity is. In figure 4(b) I present 
Lemminkäinen’s share liquidity compared to a couple of other family firms. The shares of 
these seven firms are quoted on the Helsinki Stock Exchange and belong to the industrials 
sector. We can see yet again that Lemminkäinen’s share has reasonably good liquidity. From 
1997 to 2008 Lemminkäinen’s share illiquidity was, on average, 0.13. The number is smaller 
than the average Amihud illiquidity for all family firms (0.21) but also smaller than the 
average for all firms (0.19). 
 
 
 
 
 67 
Figure 4 Share liquidity measured by Amihud illiquidity 
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6.3 Lemminkäinen’s market performance and share liquidity 
 
In chapter 5 I use Tobin’s q as a firm’s value measure. From 1997 to 2008 Lemminkäinen’s 
Tobin’s q was on average 1.12. That number is smaller than the average Tobin’s q for all 
firms (2.22), but it is also smaller than the average Tobin’s q for family firms (1.36). From the 
corresponding period the average P/E-ratio for Lemminkäinen was 10.0919. Figure 5 
illustrates Lemminkäinen’s Tobin’s q as well as the P/E-ratio and Amihud illiquidity.  
 
Figure 5 Market performance and share illiquidity 
 
(a) Tobin’s q and Amihud illiquidity 
 
 
 
(b) P/E-ratio and Amihud illiquidity 
 
Source: Panel of Finnish listed firms over 1997-2008 
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According to the regression results from the previous chapter, holding other variables 
constant, firm value should increase when the liquidity of share increases. In figure 5 we can 
see this effect. In figure 5(a) I have multiplied Amihud illiquidity by 10 so the relationship 
can be seen more easily. In 2001 Amihud illiquidity started to decline and at the same Tobin’s 
q, on average, increased until 2005. In 2007 share illiquidity and Tobin’s q reversed 
directions. Share illiquidity started to increase and Tobin’s q decreased. In figure 5(b) I 
multiplied Amihud illiquidity by 100. Again we can see the negative relationship between 
share illiquidity and Lemminkäinen’s value. It is not as clear as it was with Tobin’s q because 
couple of times the P/E-ratio and share illiquidity moved in same direction. However, 
between 2001 and 2002 Lemminkäinen’s P/E-ratio rose and at the same time share liquidity 
improved. 
 
 
Like I mentioned before Lemminkäinen belongs to the Industrials sector. If we compare the 
Industrials sector to other sectors and the effect they have on Tobin’s q we can conclude that 
Energy, Information technology, and Telecommunication services have, on average, a better 
Tobin’s q than firms in the Industrials sector. However, firms in the Consumer staples sector 
have, on average, a lower Tobin’s q than firms in the Industrials sector.  
 
 
Lemminkäinen’s share liquidity, on average, is better than in other listed firms, but 
Lemminkäinen’s Tobin’s q is worse than the average Tobin’s q of other firms. Under the 
circumstances Lemminkäinen suffers quite a lot from their family firm status. According to 
the results from chapter 5, if a family firm’s share illiquidity increases by one unit, holding 
the other variables constant, the family firm’s value decreases by 0.02952 units. Instead, if a 
non-family firm’s share illiquidity increases by one unit there is no statistically significant 
effect on the firm’s value. Lemminkäinen’s Tobin’s q has stayed at a quite stable rate. Its 
standard deviation is 0.1408. If we compare the coefficient estimate of a family firm’s share 
illiquidity with Lemminkäinen’s Tobin’s q standard deviation the result is then 20.97% of 
Tobin’s q standard deviation. So a family firm’s share illiquidity explains almost 21 % of the 
fluctuations of Lemminkäinen’s Tobin’s q around its mean value assuming that the average 
effect that I found in the model is valid for Lemminkäinen. Lemminkäinen is a well-known 
family firm and it has surely benefited from a concentrated ownership structure. Someone 
once said that it is good to have a face for firm. However, as it seems, concentrated ownership 
has drawbacks as well. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this master’s thesis was to investigate the relationship between family firm market 
performance and share liquidity. The motivation behind this study was my case company 
Lemminkäinen. There has been discussion for a long period of time on whether family firms 
are worse or better performers than non-family firms. Recent analyses of public companies 
indicate that family firms outperform non-family firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
discovered, when using both accounting performance measures and market performance 
measures, that family firms are better performers than non-family firms. Sraer and Thesmar 
confirmed better accounting performances for family firms and Villalonga and Amit’s (2006) 
study confirmed, under certain conditions, that family firms are better market performers. 
These studies, however, were not saved from criticism. Miller et al. (2007) found that the out-
performance of family firms was a result of how these firms were defined. 
 
A new subject that I introduce to the discussion of family firms is share liquidity. 
Approximately 25 years ago Amihud and Mendelson (1986) discovered the effect share 
liquidity has on the expected return. The findings of many other researchers have supported 
Amihud and Mendelson’s study. Chordia et al. (2001) discovered a negative and significant 
relationship between average stock returns and the level of trading activity. Pástor and 
Stambaugh (2003) discovered that the average return on stocks with high sensitivities to 
liquidity exceeds that for stocks with low sensitivities. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) derived 
the liquidity adjusted CAPM model in which an asset’s expected return depends on its relative 
illiquidity cost, on market return, and on relative market illiquidity. Based on these findings 
and further contemplations we can assume that share liquidity affect share prices as well. 
Loderer and Roth (2005) authenticated this assumption since they investigated pricing 
discount for limited liquidity. Consequently the increase in share liquidity should increase 
firm value when the value is measured by Tobin’s q or the P/E-ratio.  
 
In my empirical part I investigated 108 firms that are listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
from 1997 to 2008. I found that Finnish family firms are worse market performers than non-
family firms. The coefficient estimate for family firms is -0.5914 and it is statistically 
significant at the one-percent level. The coefficient estimate for family firms is 22% of the 
Tobin’s q standard deviation. So we can say that it is economically significant as well. This is 
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not consistent with recent analysis of public companies. Possible explanations for this could 
be a different definition of a family firm, a different research period, different value measures, 
or Finnish family firms might simply have a lower value on the market.  
 
I also found a strong negative relationship between a family firm’s share illiquidity and firm 
value. The coefficient estimate for a family firm’s share illiquidity is statistically significant at 
the one-percent level as well. This result is consistent with previous studies as it is with my 
expectations as well. However, I did not found a statistically significant effect of a non-family 
firms’ share illiquidity on firm value. As a conclusion of my empirical analysis it is evident 
that only family firms suffer the effect of share illiquidity on firm value.  
 
When I compared these results with Lemminkäinen’s share liquidity and its market value the 
results proved to be true. Lemminkäinen’s share is quite liquid when comparing it to the 
shares of other firms on the Helsinki Stock Exchange but Lemminkäinen’s Tobin’s q is, on 
average, lower than the average Tobin’s q of other Helsinki Stock Exchange firms. A family 
firm’s share illiquidity explains almost 21 % of the fluctuations of Lemminkäinen’s Tobin’s q 
around its mean value. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table 1 The accounting measure of a firm’s performance 
 
 
The table presents regressing firm performance on family ownership. The dependent variable is the return on 
assets. The data spanned from 1992 through 1999 and covered 403 firms. The firms are Standard & Poor’s 500 
firms. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
RETURN ON ASSETS – the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) divided by 
total assets. 
FAMILY FIRM – the binary variable that equals one when the founding family is present in the firm.  
YOUNG FAMILY – equals one when firm age is less than 50 years and the family is present in the firm. 
OLD FAMILY – equals one when firm age is greater than or equal to 50 years and the family is present in the 
firm. 
CEO HIRE – equals one when the CEO is a non-family member in a family firm. 
CEO FOUNDER – equals one if the CEO is the founder of the firm. 
CEO DESCENDANT – equals one if the CEO is a founders’ descendant. 
OFFICER/DIRECTOR OWN – the insider ownership less family ownership. 
UNAFFILIATED BLOCKHOLDERS – the aggregate fractional holdings of entities holding more than five 
percent of the firm’s shares. 
OUTSIDE DIRECTORS – the number of independent directors divided by board size. 
CEO EQUITY-BASED PAY – the annual value of option grants divided by total CEO pay.  
R&D/SALES – research and development expenses divided by total assets. 
LT DEBT/TOTAL ASSETS – the book value of long-term debt divided by total assets. 
RETURN VOLATILITY – the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the previous 60 months. 
LN(TOTAL ASSETS) – the natural logarithm of total assets. 
LN(FIRM AGE) – the natural logarithm of number of years since firm inception. 
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 APPENDIX 2 
Table 2 The accounting performance of family firms 
 
 
The table presents regressing firm performance on family ownership. The dependent variable is return on assets. 
The data spanned over the 1994-2000 period French listed firms.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
RETURN ON ASSETS – earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) divided by 
book value of total assets. 
FAMILY FIRM – equals one when there is a family ownership. 
FOUNDER CEO – equals one if the CEO is the founder of the firm. 
HEIR CEO – equals one if the CEO is a founders’ descendant. 
PROFESSIONAL CEO – equals one when the CEO has been hired by the controlling family. 
LOG(ASSETS) – the logarithm of the book value to total assets. 
LOG(FIRM AGE) – the logarithm of firm age measured in years plus one. 
FORMER SOE – equals one if the firm as a former state owned enterprise. 
FRACTION EQUITY OF LARGEST BLOCK – the cash-flow right of the largest identified shareholder. 
DEBT/ASSETS – the leverage ratio, debt divided by assets. 
STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY – the standard deviation of the firm’s stock price. 
INDUSTRY FE – the regressions control for 13 industries fixed effects. 
YEAR FE – the regressions control for years fixed effects. 
DESCENDANT=PROFESSIONAL – provides the p-value of an equality test between the coefficient 
“DESCENDANT CEO” and “PROFESSIONAL CEO”. 
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     APPENDIX 3 
Table 5 Excess returns and liquidity 
 
 
The table presents two sets of results, one for the dollar trading volume and one for the turnover. The dependent 
variable in the first and second column is the excess return. The independent variables are the firm 
characteristics, measures as the deviation from the cross-sectional mean in each period. The variables relate to a 
monthly average of 1,787 NYSE and AMEX stocks over 360 months from January 1966 through December 
1995. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. T-statistics are in parentheses.  
 
SIZE – the natural logarithm of the market value of the equity of the firm as of the end of the second to last 
month. 
BM – the natural logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity plus deferred taxes to the market value 
equity, using the end of the previous year market and book values. 
PRICE – the natural logarithm of the reciprocal of the share price as reported at the end of the second to last 
month. 
DVOL – the natural logarithm of the dollar volume of trading in the security in the second to last month. 
TURN – the natural logarithm of the share turnover measured by the number of shares traded divided by the 
number of shares outstanding in the second to last month. 
YLD – the dividend yield as measured by the sum of all dividends pair over the previous 12 months, divided by 
the share price at the end of the second to last month. 
RET 2-3 – the cumulative return over the two months ending at the beginning of the previous month. 
RET 4-6 – the cumulative return over the three months ending three months previously. 
RET 7-12 – the cumulative return over the six months ending six months previously. 
CVVOL – the natural logarithm of the coefficient of variation of dollar volume calculated over past 36 months 
beginning in the second to last month. 
CVTURN – the natural logarithm of the coefficient of variation of turnover calculated over the past 36 months 
beginning in the second to last month. 
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     APPENDIX 4 
 
The division of firms into family firms and non-family firms used in the regression 
model 
 
 
Affecto Oyj Information technology Small cap non-family  
 
Ahlström Oyj Materials Mid cap  family 
 
Aldata Solution Oyj Information technology Small cap non-family  
 
Amer Sport Oyj Consumer discretionary Mid cap non-family  
 
Aspo Oyj Industrials Mid cap non-family  
 
Aspocomp Group Oyj Information technology Small cap non-family  
 
Atria Oyj Consumer staples Mid cap non-family  
 
Basware Oyj Information technology Small cap non-family  
 
Biohit Oyj Health care Small cap  family 
 
Biotie Therapies Oyj Health care Small cap non-family  
 
Cargotec Oyj Industrials Large cap  family 
 
Cencorp Oyj Information technology Small cap   both 
Componenta Oyj Industrials Small cap  family 
 
Comptel Oyj Information technology Mid cap non-family  
 
Cramo Oyj Industrials Mid cap non-family  
 
Digia Oyj Information technology Small cap non-family  
 
Efore Oyj Industrials Small cap   both 
Elecster Oyj Industrials Small cap non-family   
Elektrobit Oyj Information technology Small cap non-family   
Elisa Oyj Telecommunication services Large cap non-family   
Etteplan Oyj Industrials Small cap   both 
Exel Composites Oyj Materials Small cap non-family   
Finnair Oyj Industrials Mad cap non-family   
Finnlines Oyj Industrials Mid cap non-family   
Fiskars Oyj Consumer discretionary Large cap non-family   
Fortum Oyj Utilities Large cap non-family   
F-Secure Oyj Information technology Mid cap  family  
GeoSentric Oyj Information technology Small cap non-family   
Glaston Oyj Industrials Mid cap non-family   
HKScan Oyj Consumer staples Mid cap non-family   
Honkarakenne Oyj Consumer discretionary Small cap  family  
Huhtamäki Oyj Materials Mid cap non-family   
Ilkka-Yhtymä Oyj Consumer discretionary Mid cap non-family   
Incap Oyj Industrials Small cap non-family   
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Ixonos Oyj Information technology Small cap non-family   
Kemira Oyj Materials Large cap non-family   
Keskisuomalainen Oyj Consumer discretionary Small cap non-family   
Kesko Oyj Consumer staples Large cap non-family   
Kesla Oyj Industrials Small cap  family  
Kone Oyj Industrials  Large cap  family  
Konecranes Oyj Industrials Large cap non-family   
Larox Oyj Industrials Small cap  family  
Lassila & Tikanoja Oyj Industrials Mid cap non-family   
Lemminkäinen Oyj Industrials Mid cap  family  
Lännen Tehtaat Oyj Consumer staples Small cap non-family   
Marimekko Oyj Consumer discretionary Small cap non-family   
Martela Oyj Industrials Small cap  family  
Metso Oyj Industrials Large cap non-family   
M-real Oyj Materials  Mid cap non-family   
Neste Oil Oyj Energy Large cap non-family   
Nokia Oyj Information technology Large cap non-family   
Nokian Renkaat Oyj Consumer discretionary Large cap non-family   
Nordic Aluminium Oyj Materials Small cap non-family   
Nurminen Logistics Oyj Industrials Small cap  family  
Oriola-KD Oyj Health care Mid cap non-family   
Orion Oyj Health care Large cap non-family   
Outokumpu Oyj Materials Large cap non-family   
Outotec Oyj Industrials Large cap non-family   
PKC Group Oyj Industrials Small cap non-family   
Pohjois-Karjalan kirjapaino 
Oyj 
Consumer discretionary Mid cap  family  
Ponsse Oyj Industrials Mid cap  family  
Proha Oyj Information technology Small cap non-family   
Pöyry Oyj Industrials Large cap non-family   
QPR Software Oyj Information technology Small cap   both 
Raisio Oyj Consumer staples Mid cap non-family   
Ramirent Oyj Industrials Mid cap non-family   
Rapala VMC Oyj Consumer discretionary Mid cap non-family   
Rautaruukki Oyj Materials Large cap non-family   
Raute Oyj Industrials Small cap  family  
Revenio Group Oyj Industrials Small cap   both 
Ruukki Group Oyj Industrials Mid cap non-family   
Salcomp Oyj Industrials Small cap non-family   
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Sanoma Oyj Consumer discretionary Large cap  family  
Scanfil Oyj Information technology Small cap  family  
Solteq Oyj Information technology Small cap  family  
SRV Yhtiöt Oyj Industrials Mid cap  family  
Stockmann Oyj Consumer discretionary Large cap non-family   
Stonesoft Oyj Information technology Small cap non-family   
Stora Enso Oyj Materials Large cap non-family   
Suominen Yhtymä Oyj Consumer stpales Small cap non-family   
Takoma Oyj Industrials Small cap  family  
Talentum Oyj Consumer discretionary Small cap non-family   
Tamfelt Oyj Industrials Mid cap non-family   
Tecnomen Lifetree Oyj Information technology Small cap non-family   
Tekla Oyj Information technology Mid cap non-family   
Teleste Oyj Information technology Small cap non-family   
Tieto Oyj Information technology Large cap non-family   
Tiimari Oyj Abp Consumer discretionary Small cap   both 
Trainers’ House Oyj Industrials Small cap  family  
Tulikivi Oyj Industrials Small cap  family  
Turkistuottajat Oyj Industrials Small cap non-family   
Turvatiimi Oyj Industrials Small cap non-family   
UPM-Kymmene Oyj Materials Large cap non-family   
Uponor Oyj Industrials Large cap non-family   
Vaahto Group Oyj Industrials Small cap  family  
Vacon Oyj Industrials Mid cap non-family   
Vaisala Oyj Information technology Mid cap  family  
Westend ICT Oyj Information technology Small cap non-family   
Viking Line Abp Consumer discretionary Mid cap non-family   
Wulff-Yhtiöt Oyj Consumer discretionary Small cap  family  
Wärtsilä Oyj Abp Industrials Large cap non-family   
YIT Oyj Industrials Large cap non-family   
Yleiselektroniikka Oyj Information technology Small cap  family  
 
